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LEGAL RESTRAINTS IN THE USE OF LANDMINES:
HUMANITARIAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
JANET E. LoRD*
Landmines may be one of the most widespread, lethal, and long lasting
forms of pollution we have yet encountered, and we are currently losing the
battle to protect innocent civilians from their effects.'
INTRODUCTION
Great strides have been made in recent years in the negotiation of
international agreements which attempt to address problems of environmental
concern.' However, one of the most endemic and pervasive problems of
environmental pollution remains, to a large extent, beyond the purview of
international environmental law. Lauterpacht's oft-quoted observation that the
law of war exists at the vanishing point of law3 places the rules relating to
landmines in an unhappy position from which to address a problem which has
reached global epidemic proportions.
The landmine crisis in over twenty-six countries throughout the world
has, in many cases, intensified instability in already fragmented societies and
threatens to undermine reconstruction efforts after years of costly civil war
or external aggression. A country such as Cambodia, faced with a severe
health crisis,4 whose infrastructure and natural resource base is rendered
unusable by the presence of landmines,5 must rely upon expensive and
technologically imperfect demining techniques to mitigate the damage which
these weapons-and other unexploded ordnance-cause.6
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1. Assistance in Mine Clearance, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda
Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/49/357/Add. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Mine Clearance].
2. See Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions in International Environmental Law, Address before the
United Nations Congress on Public International Law (March 15, 1995). Weiss reports that the some 900
treaties negotiated since 1972 amount to a "treaty congestion" in the sense that critics complain of
overlapping mechanisms and inconsistencies in provisions, demonstrating that efficiency needs to be
improved. Id. at 4.
3. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1, 225 n.5 (1990).
4. See ASIA WATCH AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LAND MINES IN CAMBODIA: THE
COWARDS' WAR 59 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter THE COWARDS' WAR].
5. Id.
6. For an assessment of current demining techniques, see generally Patrick M. Blagden, Summary of
United Nations Demining in SYMPOSIUM ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES: MONTREUX 117 (1993) [hereinafter
SYMPOSIUM]; Paul Jefferson, An Overview of Demining, Including Mine Detection Equipment, in
SYMPOSIUM, id. at 125; Brian Halliwell & L. Malin, Demining-An Operator's View in SYMPOSIUM, id.
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The littering of landmines across the globe constitutes a significant
humanitarian, environmental and developmental challenge. It is no exag-
geration to present the landmine crisis as a threat to international peace
which, it is thought, must be based upon the existence of secure and stable
governments which are poised to pursue sustainable development.7 Thus it
is the case that landmines present the international legal system with a
formidable task: international law provides no immediate answers either in
terms of responsibility for mine removal or in terms of enforcement of
regulations which do exist. For example, there is no verification mechanism
to evaluate the implementation of rules governing the use of landmines.
Developing countries do not have the financial means to undertake costly
mine clearance operations which adds further pressure to a fragile peace in
countries recovering from war.
Part I of this article outlines the scope of the landmine problem in
countries throughout the world and the impact of widespread and often
indiscriminate landmine use on people and their environment. Country
conditions in the Falkland-Malvinas Islands, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia, Croatia, and Mozambique provide the basis for an understanding
of the multi-dimensional societal problems posed by landmine use. Part II
examines the legal framework which governs the use of landmines under
international humanitarian law. Part III concludes by evaluating the
effectiveness of the current legal regime governing the use of landmines in
armed conflict and advances proposals for future reform.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE LANDMINE PROBLEM
Anti-tank mines destroy tanks, impede enemy forces, deny access to
strategic locations, and encourage the channeling of enemy forces into
at 133; J. Alastair Craib, Mine Detection and Demining, in SYMPOSIUM, id. at 147; Terry J. Gander, Mine
Detection and Mine Clearance, in SYMPOSIUM, id. at 175; Curt Larsson, Radar, Multispectral and
Biosensor Techniques for Mine Detection, in SYMPOSIUM, id. at 179. See also THE ARMS PROJECT AND
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY 243 (1993) [hereinafter ARMS
PROJECT]; OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE KILLERS: THE
GLOBAL PROBLEM WITH UNCLEARED LANDMINES 15 (1993) [hereinafter OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY OPERATIONS].
7. This is precisely the position articulated by the U.S. Department of State in its report on
international demining. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 178. The
landmine crisis has been considered by numerous organizations in recent years, including the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, the Economic Community of West African States, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Handicapped International, Human Rights Watch, Medecins
Sans Frontieres, Medical International, Mines Advisory Group, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation,
Friends World Committee, Handicap International, and Physicians for Human Rights. Many organizations
have made a substantial contribution to research on the various dimensions of the landmine problem in the
form of reports on country conditions. See, e.g., AFRICA WATCH, LANDMINES IN ANGOLA (1993);
AMERICAS WATCH, LANDMINES IN EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA: THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS (1986); THE
COWARDS' WAR, supra note 4; MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HIDDEN DEATH: LAND MINES AND CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN IRAQI KURDISTAN (1992); HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, LA GUERRE DES LACHES (1992);
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HIDDEN ENEMIES: LAND MINES IN NORTHERN SOMALIA (1992); MINES
ADVISORY GROUP, REPORT OF THE AFGHANISTAN MINES SURVEY (1991).
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particular routes to the advantage of friendly forces.' Anti-personnel mines,
initially developed for use in conjunction with anti-tank mines, delay and
hinder the clearing of anti-tank mines, harass ground troops and delay their
movement.9 The use of anti-personnel mines gradually expanded and is now
employed as a nuisance factor, contributing to the disruption of enemy supply
lines and creating a demoralizing effect among enemy troops.'0  The
development of new types of anti-personnel mines which can be deployed
from aircraft has contributed to the proliferation of landmine use in recent
decades." Mines are no longer exclusively emplaced by hand. Today,
mines can be delivered by artillery, mortar, or aircraft. 2 Moreover, in
recent decades inexpensive mines with a low metal content made principally
of plastics or ceramics have expanded the market in landmines. 3  These
innovations make it increasingly difficult to maintain the traditional law of
war distinction between combatants and non-combatants and between military
and non-military objectives. 4
Concern in recent years has focused on the unconventional military tactics
of insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists whose strategies have contributed to
widespread mining of agricultural lands, villages, water sources, and civilian
objects such as religious sites. 15 Sub-national or ethnic groups engaged in
armed conflicts over a disputed territory are interested in using weapons
which are cheap, lightweight and uncomplicated. 6 Mines, and the smaller
categories of anti-personnel mines in particular, are a readily available
weapon of choice.17
Unlike so many challenges to the environment which are rife with
scientific uncertainty, we know precisely what effect landmines can have on
present and future generations. World War II mines continue to maim and
8. See generally Mine Clearance, supra note 1. See also Alan Epstein, Mine Warfare, in OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 11.
9. Gander, supra note 6, at 203. For a general overview of the development and use of landmines in
modem combat, see ARMS PROJECT supra note 6, at 16-34.
10. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 11, 13.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 12. See also ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 27. Some 18 countries are reported to have
produced low-metal or minimum-metal anti-personnel mines, including Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, China,
Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,
the United States, the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia. These landmines are extremely difficult
to detect, deactivate and destroy and pose serious medical problems because plastic fragments are not
detected by standard x-ray equipment. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 28.
14. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 80-82, 114 (1990).
15. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 7.
16. For an overview oflandmine pricing, see ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 55-57. Anti-personnel
mines may be purchased for as little as $3 each and anti-tanks mines for less than $75 each. OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 2.
17. The use of anti-personnel mines has proliferated and caused the "intensely local and guerilla
nature" of many recent conflicts. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 27.
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kill in many countries throughout Europe and parts of Africa."8 Recent
armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Kuwait, and the republics
of the former Yugoslavia have created landmine problems of unprecedented
scale which will pose a threat to civilians for many years to come.' 9 Some
fifty-six countries throughout Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East,
East Asia, and South Asia have significant landmine problems.20 The
degradation of uncleared landmines is an exceedingly slow process and land
left uncleared or only partially cleared is rendered useless for years and even
decades after emplacement. 2 The humanitarian, environmental and develop-
mental consequences which the presence of landmines can have on a society
will vary according to the manner and extent of mining, the type of mines
used, and the success of demining operations. However, even under the best
circumstances, landmines create major obstacles for any country challenged
with their clean-up. The aftermath of armed conflict in a number of countries
throughout the world has created an unparalleled crisis owing to the massive
increase in the emplacement of landmines and the inability of clearance
operations to achieve the high levels of removal necessary for the protection
of the civilian population and to facilitate reconstruction efforts.22
A. Falkland-Malvinas Islands
Despite the advanced capabilities of the British Armed Forces in mine
location, removal and destruction,23 vast tracts of land in the Falkland-
Malvinas Islands have been cordoned off due to the inability of the demining
operation to clear all mines and other unexploded ordnance from the
archipelago.24
This dilemma has prompted the British Government to offer a reward for
18. An average of twelve people per year are injured in the Netherlands as a result of World War
I1 landmines. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 5. The UN
representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has made repeated appeals before the United Nations General
Assembly in order to pressure former colonialist powers to assist in the identification of World War 11 era
minefield locations and to provide compensation for losses of life and property caused by minefields. U.N.
GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/35/PV.25 (prov. ed. 1980).
19. See infra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
20. For a country analysis of the landmine problem prepared by the U.S. Department of State, see
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 41-177. See also ARMS PROJECT,
supra note 6, at 141-233.
21. For an account of the devastating effects of uncleared landmines and other explosive ordnance
from World War II on Libyan development, see Khairi Sgaier, Explosive Remnants of World War 11 in
Libya: Impact on Agricultural Development, in EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR: MITIGATING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 33-37 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1985).
22. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 9, 10. See also ARMS
PROJECT, supra note 6, at 234, 235.
23. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 172.
24. John Leonard, Spring Fails to Chase Fear from Falklands, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1982, at A23.
According to media accounts, mines which were laid on peat bogs which supply Port Stanley's fuel have
rendered such areas too dangerous for residents to enter. The reports of experts indicate that the economy
of the islands faces collapse unless the British Government makes good its attempt to stimulate
development. The mining of farm yards, peat bogs and beaches presents a real obstacle to development.
Id.
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any individual who comes up with a successful plan which will rid the
remaining landmines" The minefield problem exists notwithstanding the
fact that the war between Argentina and the United Kingdom conformed to
the practices of conventional armed conflict, with mined areas being
identified and mapped by the armed forces.26 The use of mining in the
Falkland-Malvinas Islands stands in stark contrast to the mining practices of
many insurgent forces fighting an internal war where conventional practices
give way to indiscriminate use of mining."
B. Kuwait
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait resulted in the laying of approximately
seven million mines. 28 Contracts to clear the country of anti-personnel and
anti-tank mines are worth some $100 million each.29 Mines laid in many
parts of Kuwait limit the seasonal movement of pastoralists and their herds
and also hinder tourism in several national parks and reserves.3" The Report
of the United Nations Mission to Kuwait indicates that even swept areas will
continue to pose a threat to the population due to the inability of current mine
clearing technology to achieve complete clearance.3 This is so notwith-
standing the comparative advantages which the Kuwaiti Government had over
other countries with severe landmine problems. The demining operation did
not suffer from the kind of fund shortage which faces most countries with a
landmine problem.32 In Kuwait most mines were surface laid and followed
a predictable pattern.33 Kuwaiti officials had the resources to launch a large
public awareness campaign regarding minefields through television, radio and
posters. 4 Readily available medical facilities in Kuwait were able to
provide the care for mine victims. 5 However, despite all of these factors,
25. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 172.
26. Halliwell & Malin, supra note 6, at 136.
27. For example, all parties in the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia are accused of using
landmines indiscriminately as weapons of terror, mining schools, churches, and other places where civilians
might seek shelter. Bosnian Serb forces are accused of using landmines to implement their policy of
"ethnic cleansing" by mining villages and essential infrastructure to inhibit the return of Muslim refugees
to their homes. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 39.
28. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 114.
29. Id. at 36. For a media account of the Kuwaiti contracts to clear mines and other explosives leftbehind by Iraqi troops, see Stuart Auerbach, US. Firms Angered by Kuwait ContractAward, WASH. POST,
Oct. 29, 1991, at DI:I.
30. See Report to the Secretary-General by a UN Mission, Assessing the Scope and Nature of Damage
Inflicted on Kuwait's Infrastructure During the Iraqi Occupation of the Country from Aug. 1990 to Feb.
27, 1991, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22535 (1991) [hereinafter Kuwait Report].
31. Id.
32. The State Department Report emphasizes that "it is beyond the financial capability of most of
these [lesser developed countries] to pay for the clearance of landmines, yet the economic burden of
allowing them to remain is even more expensive." OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS,
supra note 6, at 10.
33. Halliwell & Malin, supra note 6, at 136.
34. See Kuwait Report, supra note 30.
35. See Halliwell & Malin, supra note 6, at 136.
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the demining operations and operator protection were not as successful as
experts anticipated. Shifting sands hindered the detection and removal
process because some mines required the digging out of five feet of sand;
fences around danger areas were removed by children and fisherman seeking
access to the water; and some areas were so extensively mined that they
required securing against citizen access for the foreseeable future.36
C. Angola
Civil strife in Angola has contributed to mining throughout the country.
Although the number of uncleared landmines is unknown, estimates range
from nine million37 to twenty million3" affecting all regions of Angola.
Africa Watch undertook a study of the landmine crisis in Angola and
concluded that mine laying was practiced in Angola from 1961 through 1991
and a recent resumption in fighting has led to further emplacement of
mines.39 Widespread mining in agricultural areas has had dire consequences
on the rural economy and has severely impeded the progress of relief
operations for the civilian population.40
Mines have rendered large areas of arable land and pasture, many roads,
bridges, riverbanks and villages, and some important economic installations,
off-limits to people. The presence of live mines represents a formidable
obstacle to commerce and free movement, to economic reconstruction, and
to the effective delivery of relief and other forms of aid. In particular,
mines will prevent the rapid and safe return of refugees.4'
The return of refugees to their homelands is exceedingly dangerous in
many areas where both major and secondary bridges are down and sur-
rounded by minefields.42 Severe food shortages in cities such as Malanje
force citizens to search for maize and manioc outside the city which is ringed
with mines.43
D. Cambodia
The reconstruction of Cambodia following years of civil war has been
especially problematic due to vast mine laying by all sides to the conflict."
36. Id. at 138.
37. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 45.
38. Jody Williams, Social Consequences of Widespread Use of Landmines, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note
6, at 69, 74.
39. AFRICA WATCH, LANDMINES IN ANGOLA (1993). See also ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 149.
For an overview of the mine assistance program in Angola, see Mine Clearance, supra note 1.
40. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 34.
41. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 150.
42. See Williams, supra note 38, at 74.
43. Angola: A Slow Death, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1993, at 46.
44. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 165.
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Mines were laid around bridges and roads, and strategic locations. Mines
were also used to secure trade routes. In some instances minefields were
planted around villages or military camps which were bombarded, forcing
evacuees into escape routes which were heavily mined.45 Mines were
emplaced in a seemingly indiscriminate fashion in areas such as fields and
forests or were laid in areas heavily used by the civilian population such as
footpaths and river beds.46 One epidemiological study of the population of
Cambodia assumes a rate of one amputation for every 236 people. 7 The
rate of amputation in the United States where no such landmine problem
exists is, by comparison, one in 22,000 people. 8
The societal consequences resulting from the extensive mining in
Cambodia are by no means confined to the immediate financial burdens
imposed by demining operations and the medical response to injuries.
Despite the action taken in Cambodia to address the landmine crisis, the
magnitude of the problem has hampered relief efforts. The existence of vast
minefields has been cited as a major obstacle to the implementation of the
Paris Agreements of 23 October 1991'9 and, in particular, to the prompt
return of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.5 The landmine
problem has also prevented many Cambodians from pursuing their livelihood.
Farmers are unable to return to hazardous fields or, where they do return,
face the real danger of being permanently injured by landmines.5 Civilians
from rural districts, unable to work in mined rice paddies, have moved into
Phnom Penh, doubling the city population and placing severe strains on
limited resources.52 Media accounts have reported an influx of landmine
victims into the cities who form gangs and extort money from shopkeepers,
causing unrest in the urban environment.53
A report issued by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre expressed serious
concern over the insufficient funding of the Cambodian demining program
45. United Nations, Secretariat, Mines in Warfare and After, DISARMAMENT NEWSLETTER, (U.N.
Office, Office for Disarmament Affairs) 14 April 1992, at 14 [hereinafter DISARMAMENT NEWSLETTER].
46. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 64, 65. For media
interviews with relief organizations working in Cambodia, see William Branigan, Cambodians Facing
Deadly Threat, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A35. The ICRC reports indicate that there are 300 new
amputee mine victims in Cambodia every month. Id.
47. Media Natura, The Deadly Legacy: Report on Western Views of Landmines and Ways of
Restricting Their Indiscriminate Use, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 271. Statistics regarding amputations
in other mine-affected regions are as follows: Angola: one per 470 people; Somalia: one per 650 people;
Uganda: one per 1,100 people; Vietnam: one per 1,250 people; Mozambique: one per 1,862 people.
Id.
48. Id.
49. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 178.
50. DISARMAMENT NEWSLETTER, supra note 45, at 14. The Paris Agreements provide that the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia will assist with clearing mines, marking known minefields,
and training Cambodians in mine awareness. Pursuant to the Agreements, the United Nations Cambodian
Mine Action Center was established to lead in mine clearing operations. At least five other aid
organizations and numerous national governments have contributed to the effort. Still, additional funding
is urgently required. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 64, 65.
51. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 64.
52. Id.
53. See Branigan, supra note 46, at A35.
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and suggested that the mandate of the organization would be undermined
without immediate financial help. 4 One can imagine the hard choices
facing the non-governmental mine clearance organizations which have joined
in the effort to clear minefields in Cambodia, given the massive scope of the
landmine problem. These groups choose demining sites in accordance with
the importance of a mined area to the community as a whole. For example,
wells, main roads, bridges and land around hospitals and schools are demined
before rice paddies.55 Clearance of mines in agricultural areas, which will
provide Cambodian refugees with their livelihood, will take decades under
current conditions. 56
E. Afghanistan
A recent report issued by the State Department describes the estimated
10 million landmines yet to be cleared in Afghanistan as "a major impedi-
ment to the repatriation of the remaining 2 million Afghan refugees in
Pakistan and the 1.5 million in Iran."57  As overall country conditions
improve, more refugees will seek to return to their homes and, as a result of
their unfamiliarity with mine locations, death and injuries will increase, thus
straining medical resources and retarding economic reconstruction.5
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) treats mine victims
throughout the developing world in its surgical hospitals and rehabilitation
facilities. The main objective of these medical activities is to provide initial
emergency aid to victims followed up by rehabilitation and the provision of
prostheses and appliances. 9 The ICRC mandate is, in this context, closely
related to the recognition that societal recovery depends upon the full social
integration of all civilians in society.6" Given the overwhelming numbers
of mine victims in countries such as Afghanistan, the restoration of functional
capacity of victims and their social integration is an extremely difficult task,
but one which is crucial for reconstruction. ICRC statistics on the provision
of emergency services to mine victims in Afghanistan suggests that the
refugee population is seriously endangered by mine presence upon return to
their communities:
According to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, more than one million refugees returned to Afghanistan in the
first nine months of 1992. Between April and June of this year, the
number of mine victims in the ICRC's hospitals alone was two or three
54. For an overview of the Cambodian mine clearance initiatives, see Mine Clearance, supra note 1.
55. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 179.
56. Id.
57. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 30.
58. Id.
59. For an overview of the medical work of the ICRC, see ICRC, A PERVERSE USE OF TECHNOLOGY:
MINES 18 (1992).
60. Id.
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times higher than during the same period the previous year. This figure
only partially mirrors the reality, since it does not take into account those
who were killed and the injured who were unable to reach a surgical
centre.6'
The war in Afghanistan left guerilla infiltration routes, government posts,
and strategic installations littered with landmines. Random placement in
wheat fields and mountains and in areas outside the one-mile radius of
abandoned outposts occurred throughout the country.62 According to the
U.S. Department of State study on international demining, the problem affects
every region in Afghanistan:
There are mines everywhere-on arable land and lowland grazing terrain,
on footpaths, on all classes of roads, on the hillsides and mountainous
grazing land, on hilltops and mountaintops, and in irrigation channels and
canals in both urban and rural settings.63
Repatriation of some three million refugees has rendered the promise of safe
passage meaningless in light of the minefield crisis.64
F. Croatia
The armed conflict which has engulfed the former Yugoslavia has created
massive human rights violations leading to the death of thousands and the
displacement of millions of people.6' A recent item on the agenda of the
UN General Assembly concerned the pressing need for a comprehensive mine
clearance program in the Republic of Croatia.66 The implementation of such
a plan was identified by the United Nations as a priority which was crucial
to the economic recovery of the country as well as the return of refugees and
displaced persons.6 7 Croation agriculture has already suffered an annual net
loss of 230 million U.S. dollars due to the vast wasteland of mines resulting
61. Id. at 8.
62. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 42. See also Jonathan C.
Randal, Afghans Face Another Threat: Landmines, WASH. POST, June 19, 1988, at A27. For the most
recent report on the problems posed by the presence of mines and other unexploded ordnance on the
economy and on society in general in Afghanistan, see Mine Clearance, supra note 1.
63. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 42.
64. See Summary Report of the Independent Council on International Human Rights: The Mining
of Afghanistan, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex to U.N. Doc. A/44/99 (1989). See also Mine Clearance,
supra note 1.
65. For an overview of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the humanitarian crisis which is the
result of continued fighting, see FRANCIS M. DENG, PROTECTING THE DISPOSSESSED 23-36 (1993). A
recent United Nations report indicates that some 2 to 5 million landmines are scattered throughout much
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia and parts of Serbia and Montenegro and an estimated
I million mines are being laid each year. As armed conflict continues, only limited clearance operations
are in effect. See Mine Clearance, supra note 1.
66. Letter dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Items 103 and 155, U.N. Doc.
A/48/490 (1993).
67. Id.
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from armed conflict.68 The logging and tourism industries have also been
cited as victims of extensive mining.69 The passage of harvest cycles
inhibits the detection of minefields owing to the accumulation of foliage and
ground vegetation which, in effect, camouflages minefields.7"
G. Mozambique
Mozambique has endured virtually uninterrupted civil conflict from the
beginning of the movement against Portuguese colonial domination in the
1960s until a cease fire was reached between the Mozambican government
and the Renamo rebels in October 1991."' The scope of the landmine
problem in Mozambique is severe and its impact on refugees and displaced
persons is devastating. One report describes Mozambique as the "classic
example of how mines inhibit refugee repatriation."72
Mozambican refugees form large refugee populations in neighboring
South Africa and Zimbabwe.73 Their efforts to return home are seriously
hampered by the widespread mining of the country. The problem of the
return of the huge refugee population to Mozambique has been exacerbated
by the effect which widespread mining has had and will continue to have on
agricultural and commercial reconstruction.74
H. The Humanitarian and Environmental Legacy
Although widespread mining during armed conflicts throughout the world
has gone on for decades, it is only in recent years that there has been any
attention given to the long term consequences of widespread mining.
Recent studies emphasize the social and medical consequences associated
with the aftermath of armed conflict in which anti-personnel mines were
used.75  Mine victims require extended hospital stays. Their survival
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 204.
72. Id. at 127. Mine assistance operations are being provided through the United Nations Operation
in Mozambique. NGOs are actively involved in clearance operations. Despite attempts to make early
progress in establishing mine clearance and assistance operations, numerous obstacles prevent the
realization of these goals. See Mine Clearance, supra note 1.
73. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 34.
74. All major roads and railroads, power lines, agricultural land, power pylons, and agricultural fields
in southern Mozambique contain uncleared landmines. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS,
supra note 6, at 127. The Mozambique National Resistance, used landmines to terrorize civilian
communities and to deny civilian access to farm lands, water, and fishing outlets. ARMS PROJECT, supra
note 6, at 207.
75. Robin Gray, Humanitarian Consequences of Mine Use, in SYMPOsIUM, supra note 6, at 63-66.
See also Chauvin B. Eshaya & R.M. Coupland, Transfusion Requirements for the Management of War
Wounded: The Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 68 BRIT. J. ANESTHESIOLOGY,
221 (1992); R.M. Coupland & A. Korver, Injuries from Anti-Personnel Mines: The Experience of the
International Committee of the Red Cross 303 BRIT. MED. J. 1509-12 (1991); D.B. Adams & C.W.
Schwab, Twenty One Year Experience with Land Mine Injuries 28 (suppl.) J. TRAUMA 159 (1988); R.
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depends upon the provision of antibiotics and adequate blood supplies. This
assumes, of course, that health care facilities and transport from the place of
injury are readily available. The surgery required for the treatment of mine
victims is time consuming and extremely demanding.76 Surgery is one of
the most expensive health care services and, as a result, surgical services are
often neglected in poor countries so that resources may be channelled to the
provision of primary health care." After the hospital stay, long term
physical therapy and prosthetic devices are needed to ensure that mine victims
can return to society and lead productive lives.7"
Environmental protection and economic development are now seen as
more or less compatible goals, hence the emergence of the concept of
"sustainable development"79 which expresses aspects of each of these goals.
At the very least, countries are now willing to accept the need to achieve a
balance between the two. The planting of landmines, particularly in less
developed countries (LDCs) with limited resources to address the problems
which such usage entails, creates real threats to the realization of both
environmental protection and economic development."0 The question of
how to achieve an acceptable balance between the two is rendered moot
where there exists a serious landmine problem. Typically, LDCs express the
Scott, Unnecessary Suffering?-A Medical View in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF
THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION (1980). For country-specific
studies, see D. Charles, The Killing Minefields of Cambodia, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 27; J.
Rautio & P. Paavolainen, Afghan War Wounded. Experience with 200 Cases, 28 J. TRAUMA 523 (1988);
L.W. Traverso, et al., Combat Casualties in Northern Thailand: Emphasis on Land Mines and Levels of
Amputation 146 MIL. MED. 682 (1981); D.E. Johnson, et al., Epidemiology of Combat Casualties in
Thailand 21 J. TRAUMA (198 i); R.M. Hardaway, Vietnam Wound Analysis 18 J. TRAUMA 635 (1978).
76. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 121. See also THE COWARDS' WAR, supra note 4, at 67
(describing the surgical technique associated with the treatment of mine injuries according to Dr. Chris
Giannou, a surgeon with the ICRC who emphasizes that debridement, the process of cutting away dead
and severely damaged tissue and the removal of debris and dirt from a wound, is extremely complicated
in mine injury cases where dirt, bacteria and shrapnel is driven into muscle tissue and that failure to
remove dead tissue and debris causes severe infection and requires further surgical procedures).
77. Gray, supra note 75, at 66.
78. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 128. See also Alain Garachon, ICRC Rehabilitation Programmes
on Behalf of War Disabled, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 81. The ICRC has created a special
department within its Medical Division to assist mine victims in countries with serious landmine problems.
Over thirty orthopaedic programmes exist for amputees, operating in collaboration with local organizations
such as ministries of health and National Red Cross Societies. The goals of these programmes are to
manufacture artificial limbs locally, where prosthetics are needed, and to train local prosthetists. Garachon,
supra note 6, at 81.
79. The broad notion of "sustainable development" refers to the concept of passing on to future
generations the resources and the knowledge required by them to pursue their own development and,
therefore, embraces some measure of restraint on activities which stand in the way of long-term
development. The UNEP Governing Council defines "sustainable development" as "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs
and does not imply in any way encroachment upon national sovereignty." Statement by the UNEP
Governing Council on Sustainable Development, Doc. UNEP/GC 15/L.37, Annex 11 (1989). For a lucid
discussion of the concept, see Gunther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge
to International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 79-83 (Winfried
Lang et al. eds., 1991).
80. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 10. The widespread and
indiscriminate use oflandmines "has placed extreme burdens on the infrastructure and economies of lesser
developed countries trying to recover from civil strife or external conflict. It is beyond the capability of
most of these countries to pay for the clearance of landmines, yet the economic burden of allowing them
to remain is even more expensive." Id.
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concern in international negotiations that attempts to control pollution will
divert resources away from their more pressing goal of economic develop-
ment."' The primary objective is to improve the welfare of their own
populations through economic development; environmental concerns may
therefore be regarded as a secondary priority, and perhaps even a threat to
developmental progress.82 Accordingly, pollution control costs are often
perceived as potential retardants of economic development, and industrializa-
tion in particular, causing LDCs to voice demands for financial or technical
assistance in exchange for support of international environmental standards.8 3
In a country with a landmine problem, the options for future development
may be severely limited.
II. SOURCES OF LAW RELEVANT TO THE USE OF LANDMINES
A. Customary Principles Relating to Weapons
The general principle of greatest significance for an assessment of
customary principles as they relate to the use of weapons in armed conflict
provides that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or
means of warfare is not unlimited.84 Recognition of this principle provided
the impetus for the first attempt by the international community to prohibit
the use of specific weapons, namely the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration
prohibiting the use of certain explosive projectiles.85 The rule against
unlimited choice of the means and methods of warfare has reemerged in
subsequent international instruments and appears as Article 3 5(1) of the 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.86
While the principle suggests by implication that the use of certain weapons
or methods of warfare is unlawful, it does not provide any insight into
specific military restraints. However, it does provide the much needed
underpinning for other customary principles and anticipates further develop-
81. For an overview of the North-South divide regarding development and environmental protection,
see Handl, supra note 79, at 83-85.
82. Id. at 84.
83. Id.
84. Article 22 of the Hague Regulations provides: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Annex), Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 2295, 2 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 90-117 (1908) [hereinafter Hague Convention IV and Hague
Regulations].
85. 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration], reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 30 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS].
86. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 2, 21, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1408 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol 1].
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ments in the law of war.8 7 This principle is of particular significance with
respect to the landmine problem because it has both humanitarian and
environmental implications.
A second fundamental principle of customary international law states that
the use of weapons which are calculated to cause unnecessary suffering is
prohibited.88 The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration prohibiting the use of
explosive projectiles is an early expression of this principle. The Declaration
bans the use of a certain class of bullets which "uselessly aggravate the
sufferings of disabled men" thereby exceeding legitimate military objectives
"contrary to the laws of humanity."" The modem formulation of the
unnecessary suffering doctrine appears in Article 35(2) of Protocol I which
provides: "It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering."9
The injuries suffered by victims of landmines and the long term medical
effects which mine blasts have are well documented.9 Less familiar is the
suffering which exists as a direct result of landmine use which is not tied to
physical suffering.9 2  Landmines are barriers to the repatriation of war
refugees to their homelands.93 Their presence also inhibits the cultivation
of farm land and the grazing of cattle, thus preventing rural populations in
mined areas from pursuing their livelihood free from the fear of severe injury.
The consequences of widespread mining span across a broad spectrum of
human activity and impact society long after their military usefulness has
expired. It is for these reasons that the legality of using landmines is
frequently assessed against the backdrop of the customary rule pertaining to
weapons deemed to cause unnecessary suffering.94
Two subsidiary principles of customary law which are based upon the
fundamental principle limiting the right of belligerents to injure the enemy are
87. This principle is the point of departure for other normative pronouncements of a far more specific
nature. Article 23 of the Hague Regulations, which follows the rule against using unlimited means,
enumerates rules of greater specificity regarding the means of injuring the enemy. Thus, for example,
Article 23(a) forbids the use of "poison or poisoned weapons," Hague Regulations, supra note 84, 36 Stat.
at 2301. Article 23(b) forbids the "kill[ing] or wound[ing] treacherously individuals belonging to the
hostile nations or army," id. at 2302; Article 23(g) forbids the destruction or seizing of the enemy's
property, "unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war," id.; and
Article 23(e) prohibits the employment of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering." Id.
88. Protocol 1. supra note 86, art. 35(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
89. St. Petersburg Declaration, 20, supra note 85. Subsequent explicit embodiments of the general
customary principle prohibiting the use of weapons deemed to cause unnecessary suffering include Article
23(e) of the Hague Regulations. See Hague Regulations, supra note 84, at 2302.
90. Protocol 1, supra note 86, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
91. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 25-32; ARMS PROJECT,
supra note 6, at 141-221.
94. See, e.g., ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 268.
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the principles of proportionality95 and discrimination.96 The concept of
proportionality "involves weighing the interests arising from the success of
the operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful effects upon
protected persons and objects on the other."97 To that end proportionality
suggests that "there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects."9 Discrimination is the
general principle which addresses the acceptability of using certain weapons,
methods of warfare and the selection of targets. 99 In the context of an
armed attack, Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks defined as follows
in Article 51(4):
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objec-
tive;
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the
effects of which cannot be limited as required by the Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction."
The two principles of proportionality and discrimination form the basis for
three additional customary principles referred to as the principles of military
necessity, humanity, and chivalry. A formulation of all three principles is
embodied in the following text taken from the Commander's Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations of the U.S. Department of the Navy:
(1) Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibit-
ed by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or
complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expendi-
ture of time, life and physical resources may be applied.
(2) The employment of any kind or degree of force not
required for the purpose of the partial or complete submission
of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life and
physical resources is prohibited.
(3) Dishonorable (treacherous) means, dishonorable expedi-
95. See generally Bernard L. Brown, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of
Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 134-55 (1976).
96. For an interesting history of the principles of proportionality and discrimination, see JAMES
TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL
INQUIRY 196-228 (1981).
97. W. J. Fenrick, New Developments in the Law Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons in
Armed Conflict, 19 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 229, 231 (1981).
98. Id.
99. DOCUMENTS, supra note 85, at 5.
100. Protocol I, supra note 86, art. 51(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
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ents, and dishonorable conduct during armed conflict are
forbidden.'
Gehring defines the modem definition of military necessity as follows:
(1) a compelling requirement that the military actions in
question be taken if the war objectives are to be achieved; and
(2) recognition that the rules of war prohibit some forms of
military action even in the face of a compelling require-
ment.'
"Compelling requirement" has been substituted by some authors for terms
such as "urgent need, admitting of no delay"'0 3 and "indispensable."'0 4
The temporal focus of this latter interpretation may not be particularly
applicable to the wide array of landmining strategies, some of which call for
heavy mining to create a more or less permanent barrier for the enemy. 0 5
The various rules of customary international law are too general to be
employed as indicators of circumstances calling for military restraint. This
is especially so within the context of weapons use. However, although
general principles relating to the use of weapons have meant little in terms
of actual practice, the rules of customary international law are nevertheless
essential sources of the law of war relating to weapons and modes of fighting.
They serve several purposes insofar as they form the foundation and rationale
for further expressions and developments in the law and provide the basis for
the inclusion of certain topics in law of war negotiations, as opposed to other
forums."0 6 Also, the various customary rules are instructive in that they can
form springboards to the formulation of specific guidelines embodying the
general principle. Customary principles addressing law of war issues have
been characterized as providing "compasses for advice" in that they can focus
the agenda for international negotiations on areas of particular concem.'0 7
Finally, as Kalshoven has observed, the legal principles touching on the use
101. United States, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NWP 9 (July 1987), reprinted in DOCu-
MENTS, supra note 85 at 5. Although national military manuals which outline the laws of war for the use
of armed forces are not themselves authoritative sources of law, they provide evidence of the law. Id. at
7.
102. Robert Wayne Gehring, Protection of the Civilian Infrastructure, 42 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 95, 98 (1978).
103. William Gerald Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251,
254 (1953).
104. N.C.H. Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 442-446
(1952).
105. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 21.
106. Hans Blix, Proceedings of the 72nd Annual Meeting, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 45 (1978).
107. Id. at 36. Carnahan asserts that one of the reasons for the interest in restricting the use of
landmines arose from the concern that the development of remotely delivered mines might be used
"indiscriminately" and thus fall foul of customary international law. Lt. Col. Burris M. Carnahan, The Law
of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol !! to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
105 MIL. L. REV. 73, 75 (1984).
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of weapons in international law may be invoked by third parties and used as
a means of moral persuasion in protests concerning particular armed
conflicts. 1"8 He is right to state, however, that "the persuasive force of such
third-party protests depends on such factors as the authority and good faith
of the protesting party, the blatancy of the violation and.., the vulnerability
of the belligerent to the pressures of public opinion."1' 9
Much of the early debate which led to a conference addressing the use
of landmines (and other conventional weapons) focused on the rules of
customary international law and the need to base further developments in the
law on a careful weighing of the principles of unnecessary suffering, "no
unlimited use," military necessity, proportionality, discrimination, humanity
and chivalry."0 Against this background, principles of customary interna-
tional law are the building blocks for a weapons regime comprised of rules
of greater specificity than generally worded norms.
B. Antecedent Law of War Treaty Provisions
Relevant to the Use of Landmines
The framework within which the law pertaining to the protection of
civilians, combatants, and prisoners of war has developed is embodied in the
four Geneva Conventions concluded in 1949."' The 1977 Protocols were
intended to bolster the protection of civilians, combatants and prisoners of
war.1'2 The 1977 Protocols helped to refine and develop the body of rules
pertaining to the means and methods of warfare - the Law of the Hague." 3
Article 35 of Protocol I thus provides:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not
unlimited.
108. Frits Kalshoven, The Conventional Weapons Convention: Underlying Legal Principles, 279
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 510, 516 (1990).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., REPORTS OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, 16 OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS (1978) [hereinafter AD Hoc
REPORTS].
111. Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
112. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
610, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol 1, supra note 86.
113. The Hague Convention IV represents an early attempt to develop the laws of war in order to
articulate standards which civilized countries would agree to follow in times of war. See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
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2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause super-
fluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." 4
The first two paragraphs represent no real change in the law and may be
seen as a reaffirmation of two rules of customary international law. ml5
However, the inclusion of paragraph 3 in Article 35 signifies a development
in the law insofar as the protection of the environment is, by implication,
directly linked to the more traditional humanitarian law notions addressed in
paragraphs 1 and 2 .1"6 One writer suggests that the appearance of para-
graph 3 in the same article as two fundamental tenets of the law of war
"implies that the protection of the environment in time of international armed
conflict should be given priority in the conduct of hostilities.""'I T
The advent of international environmental law has contributed to the
movement for recognition of the right to a safe environment in both the
domestic and international legal systems." 8  While there exists a major
debate on the advisability of using rights language in the expression of
environmental values and norms," 9 the relationship between the concerns
of international environmental law and international human rights law
suggests that the right to a safe environment may be of some benefit: "In
particular, the right to a safe environment can play a useful and justifiable
role in protecting human interests in a safe environment and in providing a
link between the environmental and human rights movements."' 2° It is in
this regard that the inclusion of paragraph 3 is useful in providing a
114. Protocol I, supra note 86, art. 35, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1408.
115. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
116. This is not to say that environmental concerns have previously been ignored in the law of war.
The prohibition against the poisoning of wells or the so-called "scorched earth policy" for example, are
ancient rules of customary law. In recent years attention has focused on the intentional destruction of
natural resources in armed conflict and the extent to which the law proscribes such activity. See, e.g.,
Marc A. Ross, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat
Intentional Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. L. REv. 515, 516 (1992).
117. Philippe Antoine, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of the Environment in
Time of Armed Conflict, 291 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 517, 521 (1992).
118. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 18-20 (1986).
119. See, e.g., the debate on the notion of planetary rights and Anthony D'Amato's criticism of the
environmental rights to future generations theory espoused by Edith Brown Weiss in Agora: What
Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 195, 198 (1991). The basis of Edith Brown Weiss's theory of intergenerational
equity is the philosophical notion that future generations have rights which impose obligations on present
generations to protect and conserve the natural environment. Additionally, present generations, as legatees
of planetary resources, have rights which entitle them to make use of the environment. See Weiss, supra
note 118, at 18-20. Weiss painstakingly traces the entry of these notions into modem legal systems. Id.
at 18-20 and App. B. See also Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity,
II ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984).
120. James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives in its
Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 281, 282 (1993).
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conceptual link between environmental protection and humanitarian concerns
within the specific context of the law of war.
There are several other treaty provisions which afford indirect protection
to civilians and the environment and which predate the creation of a specific
conventional weapons regime.
In Protocol I, Part IV is devoted to the protection of the civilian popula-
tion.' 2' Chapter II of Part IV deals with civilians and the civilian popula-
tion. 2 Chapter III of Part IV concerns civilian objects'23 , and Chapter IV
of Part IV 24 provides for certain precautionary measures to be taken in the
interest of civilians.
Articles 51(4) and (5) of Protocol I prohibit indiscriminate attacks and
attacks which "employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.' 1 25  The protection of
civilian objects is addressed in Article 52 and limits attacks to military
objectives. 26  Article 54(2) deals with the protection of objects which are
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population including "foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking
water installations and supplies and irrigation works.', 127  Article 57 lists
precautions which must be taken with respect to the planning and carrying out
of attacks and, with respect to the use of weapons, requires that those who
plan or decide to launch an attack shall take "all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any
event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects."' 28 Article 57 also calls for the cancellation or
suspension of an attack where the objective is not a military one or is subject
to special protection or where excessive incidental civilian injury may be
expected to occur.'2 9 Furthermore, Article 57 requires advance warning of
attacks which may affect the civilian population unless circumstances do not
permit it.' ° Finally, Article 58 provides for precautions which belligerents
must take to ensure the protection of civilian objects including precautions
necessary "to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
121. Protocol I, supra note 86, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25, 16 I.L.M. at 1412..
122. Protocol I, supra note 86, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413. Chapter II is comprised of
Article 50, on the definition of civilians and the civilian population, and Article 51, addressing the specific
protection accorded to the civilian population.
123. Id. Articles 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 accord protection to civilian objects, id., 1125 U.N.T.S. at27-
28, 16 I.L.M. at 1414-15.
124. Id. Articles 57 and 58 prescribe rules on the precautions to be taken in conduct of military
operations in attack and precautionary measures to be taken against the effects of attacks, id., 1125
U.N.T.S. at 29-30, 16 I.L.M. at 1415-16.
125. Id., art. 51, 1 4 and 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26-27, 16 I.L.M. at 1413-14.
126. Id., art. Article 52, I 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
127. Id., art. 54, 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27-28, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
128. Id., art. 57, 1 2(a)(ii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29, 16 I.L.M. at 1415-16.
129. Id., art. 57, 2(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29, 16 I.L.M. at 1416.
130. Id., art. 57, 2(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29, 16 I.L.M. at 1416.
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military operations."13'
The value of Article 35 of Protocol I, in reaffirming the principles of the
law of war and contributing to its development is clear. However, the general
principles housed in Article 35 and the broadly drafted provisions in Chapters
II, III, and IV of Protocol I place too few limits on the conduct of hostilities.
Therefore, these provisions are ill-suited to address the concerns which
widespread landmine use has raised. Furthermore, the application of treaties
which do not explicitly address the use of a particular weapon or other aspect
of armed conflict to new weapons or other developments is of dubious
practical utility, particularly when one considers the typical State practice of
declining to transfer the application of provisions to new developments.'
While the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration3 3 applies, in theory, to certain
incendiary weapons under 400 grammes weight,13 1 State practice did not
support the application of the Declaration to new weapons. 3' Therefore,
the need arose to conclude an agreement which related specifically to
incendiaries.
C. The Weapons Convention and the Mines Protocol
The history of modem efforts to conclude a treaty to restrict or prohibit
the use of conventional weapons has been traced to the impetus provided by
the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross held in Vienna in
1965.36 The International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968
specifically called upon the United Nations to study the need for new
international treaties to prohibit or restrict the use of certain methods and
means of warfare. 137  Although continued efforts were made by the United
Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to address the
subject of international restriction on the use of weapons, no serious and
concerted negotiations took place until the convening of the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law which met from 1974 to 1977
131. Id., art. 58, l(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 30, 16 I.L.M. at 1416.
132. Roberts and Guelff make the observation that although provisions relating to the use of one
category of weapons may be applied in principle to other types of weapons, State practice runs contrary
to this type of interpretive venture. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 85, at 30.
133. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 85, at 30.
134. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration provides: "The Contracting Parties engage mutually to renounce,
in case of war among themselves, the employment by their military or naval troops of any projectile of
a weight below 400 grammes, which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable
substances." Id. (emphasis added).
135. DOCUMENTS, supra note 85, at 30.
136. Captain J. Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or
Humanitarian Law? 105 MIL. L. REV. 3, 6 (1984). Resolution XXVII of the Conference urged the
International Committee of the Red Cross to pursue the development of international humanitarian law and
to address the dangers to civilians during armed conflict. For the text of the resolution, see D. SCHINDLER
& J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 195 (2d ed. 1981).
137. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.33/41 (1968), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 136, at 197.
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and produced two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 3 '
However, the Conference was unable to conclude any agreements on the
restriction or prohibition of any specific conventional weapons. The
Conference was successful in establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on
Weapons, which laid the groundwork for future negotiations on a weapons
treaty. '
The United Nations Conventional Weapons Conference adopted the
Conventional Weapons Convention and three annexed protocols relating to
non-detectable fragments, mines, booby-traps and similar devices, and
incendiary weapons. 4  The optional Protocol on Prohibitions or Restric-
tions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices [hereinafter
Landmines Protocol] 4' represents the first attempt to establish a legal regime
specifically intended to deal with the use of landmines in armed conflict.'42
Prior to the negotiation of the Weapons Convention and Landmines Protocol,
the law relating to the use of landmines was comprised of principles of vague
and uncertain scope such as military necessity and the principle of proportion-
ality, as well as the prohibition against the use of weapons of indiscriminate
effects.' 43 The law of war provided little guidance to the military com-
mander or international lawyer. In order for a treaty to fill the apparent
lacunae in the law of war pertaining to the use of conventional weapons such
as landmines in a manner that would be agreeable to governments, a delicate
balance had to be achieved. One representative present at the First Session
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons summarized the legal
challenge as follows: "In order to draw a dividing line between acceptable
and unacceptable weapons and methods of warfare, it would be necessary to
rely on the two criteria of unnecessary harm or suffering and indiscriminate
effects, and, secondly, to strike a fair balance between humanitarian and
138. See supra notes 86 and 112.
139. See generally AD HOC REPORTS, supra note 110.
140. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, with annexed Protocols,
opened for signature April 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, Annex 1 to U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15, at 20(1980) [hereinafter Weapons Convention and Landmines Protocol]. For a detailed examination of the
legislative history of the Weapons Convention which is not available as a printed record of the sessions,
see Roach, supra note 136.
141. Cf 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines,
October 18, 1907, 36 tat. 2332 (providing for limitations on the use of automatic contact mines at sea).
There is some talk of updating the 1907 Convention on naval mining by way of annexing a new protocol
to the 1980 Weapons Convention. Sweden presented a working paper and a draft protocol on the subject
of naval mines at the 1989 session of the Disarmament Commission intended to update the 1907 Hague
Convention. See Note verbale Dated 4 November 1991.from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex to U.N. Doc. A/C.1/46/ 5 (1991). Given
the law of war distinction between the use of mines at sea and mines on land, this paper refers to the
"Landmines Protocol."
142. Here the usage of the term "regime" is intended to refer to a set of rules which are applicable
to the regulation and control of the effects of specific behavior. The development of the concept of
"international regime" has taken place within the context of international environmental law and its value
has been argued with persuasion. See, e.g., Winfried Lang, The International Waste Regime, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 79, at 147.
143. See supra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
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military considerations."' 144
The Weapons Convention and annexed Protocols represent the end result
of the above-mentioned summons. It is the preamble of the Weapons
Convention, rather than the text itself, which refers back to the principles of
customary law forming the foundation and rationale for the conclusion of an
agreement on conventional weapons. 145  The preamble thus refers to the
protection of the civilian population in time of armed conflict through the
concepts of "superfluous injury" and "unnecessary suffering.' 46  The
preamble also calls attention to the prohibition against employing means or
methods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe consequences to the natural environ-
ment, 47 thus bringing one facet of environmental harm squarely within the
purview of international humanitarian law. Interestingly, the preamble alludes
to the interest of the Contracting Parties to contribute to the ending of the
arms race and to work towards disarmament.1 48  This is suggestive of a
blurring of the traditional sectoral division in international law between
disarmament and the law of war 14' and raises interesting questions for
future developments in the analysis of the conceptual partition.
D. Substantive Provisions of the Weapons
Convention and Landmines Protocol
The Weapons Convention applies to international armed conflicts as
defined in Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 5' The
144. AD Hoc REPORTS, supra note 110, at 49. Mr. Ofstad of Norway framed the task of drafting a
treaty on specific weapons in succinct terms: "The legal difficulty was to relate general standards such
as 'unnecessary suffering' to the concept of 'military necessity."' Id. at 7.
145. Weapons Convention, pmbl., supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 164.
149. Roach observes that one of the difficulties of convening a conference relating to the regulation
of the use of specific conventional weapons in the early 1970s was the notion that the subject went beyond
the scope of the law of war and, therefore, should be addressed within the context of disarmament. Roach,
supra note 136, at 9. See also Hans Blix, Remarks, Panel: Human Rights and Armed Conflict:
Conflicting Views, 67 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 141, 155-56 (1973); Conference of Government Experts -
Geneva 24 May-12 June 1971 (I1), 1971 INT'L REV. RED. CROSS 587, 592-95. This matter received some
attention in the early 1980s as negotiations for the Weapons Convention were underway. See Paul C.
Szasz, The Conference on Excessively Injurious or Indiscriminate Weapons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 212, 214
(1980).
150. Article 2 provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound in their mutual relations. They shall
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treaty also applies to armed conflicts falling within the scope of Article 1(4)
of Protocol I.15 1 Article 2 provides that none of the provisions in the treaty
or the protocols shall detract from other obligations imposed by international
humanitarian law. 15
2
Article 8 of the Weapons Convention addresses the subject of treaty
review and amendments.'53 Following in the tradition of modem treaty-
making, and of international environmental agreements in particular, Article
8 provides that any party to the Convention may propose amendments to the
treaty or to any annexed protocol to which it is bound. 5 4 If a majority of
at least eighteen parties agree, a conference will be convened to consider the
tabled amendments.'55 All parties may attend such a conference, but only
those parties to a particular protocol may decide on amendments to that
protocol.'56 Similarly, Article 8 provides for the convening of a conference
to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional
weapons not considered in the other protocols.'57 The importance of this
provision should not be underestimated. International environmental law
treaties often provide for review meetings which ensure the Parties' continued
attention on implementation.1
58
Article 6 of the Weapons Convention requires parties to disseminate the
Convention and the annexed Protocols as widely as possible and, in
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
See generally Geneva Conventions, supra note 111.
151. Article 1(4) refers to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination".
Protocol 1, art. 1, 4, supra note 86, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16 I.L.M. at 1397. The Weapons Convention
follows the usual procedures in terms of treaty ratification, acceptance, approval and accession, all of which
are governed by Article 7. Weapons Convention, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 165. The only
deviation from these norms is the procedure allowed for during an international armed conflict, including
a national war of liberation, which appears in Article 7(2) and (4). Under Article 7, a State which is not
bound by the same Protocols as its enemy may enter into an agreement for the duration of hostilities to
accept and apply the relevant provisions. This procedure allows a national liberation movement to enter
into such an agreement with its adversary as well. Weapons Convention, art. 7, supra note 140, 1342
U.N.T.S at 165.
152. Roach notes that the scope of Article 2 is quite broad, taking into account principles of
customary law in addition to international agreements, in contrast to the original proposal of the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands which would have made reference only to treaty obligations. Roach, supra
note 136, at 36.
153. Weapons Convention, art. 8, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 166.
154. Id. These provisions allow for the on-going negotiation and elaboration of rules or standards
which fosters implementations and "gives treaties a dynamic character and enables the parties to respond
to new problems or priorities." PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 161 (1992).
155. Weapons Convention, art. 8, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 166.
156. Id.
157. Id. For the moves made pursuant to this provision, see infra notes 229-231 and accompanying
text.
158. However, the absence of a provision requiring the parties to keep under continuous review and
evaluation the implementation of their obligations in international environmental law agreements is said
to risk falling into the category of "sleeping treaties." See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 154, at 162.
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particular, to their armed forces.' 59 The obligation requiring dissemination
is an inheritance from other international humanitarian law treaties and may,
perhaps, represent an emerging norm of customary international law.
60
The primary difficulty with the mandate set forth in Article 6 is the manner
and extent of its implementation. 16' The obligation covers only dissemina-
tion among armed forces. In civil war conflicts, where the use of conven-
tional weapons is of particular concern, it is doubtful whether all parties to
a conflict will be aware of the laws of war, assuming there even exists the
motivation to adhere to such rules. This point illustrates the potential role
which international organizations can play in promoting the education of all
parties to an armed conflict and the inherent difficulty in reaching all those
parties to whom the Weapons Convention applies.
162
The Landmines Protocol applies to the use of mines and booby traps on
land. 163  Article 2(1) defines "mine" in broad terms so as to include
landmines placed by hand as well as the so-called "scatterable mines" which
may be delivered by aircraft or by artillery, rocket, mortar, or similar
means. 64 The definition set forth in Article 2(l) also takes into account the
wide array of mine laying techniques and the manner of detonation of modern
landmines as it brings within its scope mines "placed under, on or near the
ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the
presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle."'
165
159. Article 6 provides:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed conflict,
to disseminate this Convention and those of its annexed Protocols by which they are bound
as widely as possible in their respective countries and, in particular, to include the study
thereof in their programmes of military instruction, so that those instruments may become
known to their armed forces.
Weapons Convention, art. 6, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 165.
160. For parallel provisions relating to dissemination in other law of war treaties, see Article I of the
1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 84, 36 Stat. at 2290; Article 47 of the First Geneva Convention,
supra note 111, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Article 48 of the Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 11l; Article 127 of the Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11; Article 144 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 111, 6 U.S.T. at 3419, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Article 83 of the 1977 First Protocol,
supra note 86, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 39, 16 I.L.M. at 1428.
161. Weapons Convention, art. 6, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 165. See Jean-Jaques Surbeck,
Dissemination of International Humanitarian Law 33 AM. U. L. REV. 125 (1983) (discussing the roles of
the National Red Cross Societies and the activities of the ICRC in the dissemination of international
humanitarian law and addressing the problem of dissemination of the laws of war in general terms).
162. The ICRC, in addition to disseminating the laws of war, also plays an important role in
overseeing the progress made by governments in their dissemination and teaching. ICRC, Dissemination
of Knowledge and Teaching of International Humanitarian Law and of the Principles and Ideals of the
Red Cross: Answers from Governments and National Societies to the ICRC Questionnaire, 24th
International Red Cross Conference, Aug. 1981, Doc. CPA/4.1/I, at 9.
163. Landmines Protocol, art. 1, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 164. The Landmines Protocol
applies to all mines used on land, including those used on beaches. The provisions do not apply to mines
used at sea which are covered under a separate regime in 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines. See supra note 141. For a thorough review of the
legislative history of the Landmines Protocol and a comprehensive discussion of its provisions, see
Carnahan, supra note 107.
164. Landmines Protocol, art. 2, 1, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168.
165. Id.
23
Lord: Legal Restraints in the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and Enviro
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
334 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The general restrictions in relation to the use of landmines, booby-traps
1667
and other devices... are found in Article 3.167 Article 3(2) prohibits
directing any such weapons against the civilian population or individual
civilians under any circumstances. 168  Article 3(3) prohibits the indiscrimi-
nate use of the applicable weapons which is defined as placement which is
not on or directed against a military objective. 169  The indiscriminate use
provision also prohibits employing a method or means of weapon delivery
which cannot be directed against a military objective or which may be
expected to cause excessive injury to civilians or excessive damage to civilian
objects. 170 Finally, Article 3(4) calls for "all feasible precautions" to be
taken to protect civilians from the effects of mines, booby-traps and other
devices. 171
Article 3 adds specific content to the customary principle of proportional-
ity and discrimination in the context of a particular set of weapons.
Moreover, the general restrictions implicitly recognize the inter-temporal
dimension of conventional weapons use by defining "indiscriminate use" in
terms of anticipated incidental damage. This is evidenced in the language
which prohibits the emplacement of "mines, booby-traps and other
devices ... which may be expected to cause incidental lOSS. ' ' 172 Such
language acknowledges the unique threat which landmines and other
unexploded ordnance on the battlefield may pose to civilians and the natural
environment long after such weapons have ceased to serve any military
function. Finally, the notions of injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects seem to encompass environmental damage such as the mining of
grazing or agricultural lands so long as such objects do not constitute a
military objective, broadly defined under Article 2(4).' Given the interest
of environmental protection in the preamble of the Weapons Convention and
166. "Booby-trap" is defined in Article 2(2) as "any device or material which is designed, constructed
or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an
apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act." This definition includes landmines which
have been tampered with in such a way as to meet the criteria set forth in Article 2(2). "Other devices"
refers to munitions which are remote-controlled or designed to detonate after a lapse of time. (Article 2(3)).
Landmines Protocol, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169. For a report indicating that Turkish forces
are experiencing serious difficulties in subduing the Kurdish guerrillas owing to the guerillas' use of
booby-traps, see Chris Hedges, Turkish Forces Report Surrounding Rebel Kurds in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
March 25, 1995, at A3.
167. Landmines Protocol, art. 3, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. This provision in Article 3 is subject to the caveat defining "feasible measures" as "precau-
tions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time,
including humanitarian and military considerations."
172. Id. Edith Brown Weiss's discourse on the inter-temporal doctrine of intemational law as applied
to the protection of the environment is particularly apt in the context of the long-term humanitarian and
environmental consequences associated with landmine use. Weiss argues that traditional international law
has been reactive in concerning itself with problems that exist in the present or in the past to the exclusion
of a broader, inter-temporal focus which not only relates the present to the past, but also the present to the
future. WEISS, supra note 118, at 34.
173. Landmines Protocol, art. 2, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168.
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in recent law of war treaties,'74 the somewhat antiquated predilection which
centers around injury to civilians and civilian objects is unhelpful.
Additional protection is accorded to the civilian population in Article 4
of the Landmines Protocol which prohibits the use of mines, booby-traps and
other devices in populated areas where ground combat is not taking place or
imminent.175 Exceptions to the rule exist where such weapons are placed
on or near enemy controlled military objectives or where measures are taken
to protect the civilian population. 76 Article 4 does not apply to remotely-
delivered mines.'77 These exceptions weaken the force of the provision and
allow, for example, the emplacement of mines around a military objective
within a city or town.' Of further concern is the unclear relationship of
the Article to the problem of the "ringed" city, where mines surround a city
or town, thus prohibiting access to relief operations or agricultural or grazing
lands. '79
Article 5 of the Landmines Protocol restricts the use of remotely-
delivered mines, such as the infamous "butterfly" which is delivered from
aircraft and floats to the ground where it arms itself.8 ° These mines may
only be used within an area which is itself a military objective or which
contains military objectives.' 8 ' In either case, the location must be accu-
rately recorded pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) (requiring the recording of "pre-
planned" minefields) or must have an effective neutralizing mechanism. 8 2
The inherent problem with recording the delivery of scatterable mines is
that they are particularly susceptible to the whims of nature. Lightweight
mines can shift in the wind and rain. 183 They may be carried away from
their initial emplacement location by drifting or melting snow. They may
become covered with accumulations of foliage and other debris. All mines,
when placed in desert terrain or beach areas, may become buried deep in the
sand. 8 4  Landmines planted in jungles, mountainous areas, wetlands or
areas with dense brush may be completely hidden. Thus, it is apparent that
the precaution of recording, an important component of the legal regime, may
not be enough to prevent the environment from wreaking its own havoc with
174. Weapons Convention, pmbl., 4, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163.
175. Landmines Protocol, art. 4, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Carnahan, supra note 107, at 82.
179. See, e.g., note 43 and accompanying text.
180. Landmines Protocol, art. 5, 4, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169. The PFM-I anti-
personnel mine or bomblet was first manufactured in the Soviet state arsenals. It is a lightweight plastic
weapon with a liquid explosive and can fit into the palm of a hand. The helicopter-dispensed weapons
have two wing-like protrusions extending from their core, hence their identification with the butterfly.
This has led to the erroneous conclusion that the PFM-I was a weapon designed to look like a butterfly
which would fall foul of the provisions relating to booby-traps in the Landmines Protocol. See OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 27.
181. Landmines Protocol, art. 5, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169.
182. Id.
183. ARMs PROJECT, supra note 6, at 240-41.
184. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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landmine emplacement.
Article 5 also calls for effective advance warning to the civilian
population where the delivery of such mines may affect civilians. 5 An
exception to the advance warning rule is allowed "where circumstances do
not permit."' 8 6 Given that many scatterable mine systems are delivered by
aircraft, it is anticipated that the exception may be invoked by States to
ensure that combatant mining teams are not cited with violations of the
Landmines Protocol. Moreover, the military necessity of a surprise attack or
the importance of safeguarding the aircraft responsible for dropping the mines
may also rank among the "circumstances" which do not permit advance
warning.8 7
Article 6 prohibits the use of certain booby-traps resembling apparently
harmless objects or which are in any way connected to or associated with
objects such as toys, medical facilities, and signs.'88 Article 7 requires the
recording of the location of all "pre-planned" minefields as well as all areas
in which they have made "large-scale" and "pre-planned" use of booby-
traps. "'89 To the extent that minefields are not "pre-planned," a term which
is not defined in the Protocol and which, therefore, the Contracting Parties are
left free to interpret, they need not be recorded. 9 ° The recording of booby-
traps is conditioned by the use of the language "pre-planned" and "large
scale."'' The provisions on the recording of the location of minefields and
booby-traps are significantly weakened by the use of these terms.
Furthermore, the parties are called upon to endeavor to record the
location of all other minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have
laid.' 92 The Technical Annex to the Landmines Protocol specifies the
guidelines for recording the location of minefields, mines, and booby-
traps. "'93 Article 7(3) calls on the parties to retain the records and, after the
cessation of hostilities, take "all necessary and appropriate measures" to
protect civilians from the effects of mine and booby-trap use.'94 Each party
is to make available to the other and to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations information in their possession concerning the location of mines and
booby-traps in adverse party territory or to make such information available
185. Landmines Protocol, art. 5, 2, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169.
186. Id.
187. Carnahan, supra note 107, at 81.
188. Landmines Protocol, art. 6, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170.
189. Landmines Protocol, art. 7, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170. The use of the term "pre-
planned" is especially problematic because of its lack of definition in the Potocol. Fenrick makes the
valid argument that the absence of a definition leaves room for state practice to contribute to the formation
of a customary principle which may undermine the recording provisions. Fenrick, supra note 97, at 245.
190. Landmines Protocol, art. 7, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Landmines Protocol, Technical Annex, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171.
194. Landmines Protocol, art. 7, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170.
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after the complete withdrawal from the territory of the adverse party.' 95
When a United Nations force or mission is in operation, recording informa-
tion must be handed over to them." Finally, Article 7(3)(c) calls for the
parties "wherever possible, by mutual agreement" to provide for the release
of information concerning mine and booby-trap location, especially in
agreements governing the end of hostilities. 97
An interesting and innovative addition to law of war treaty-making is the
provision found in Article 8 of the Landmines Protocol which requires a party
to remove or render harmless, insofar as possible, landmines and booby-traps
in an area where a United Nations force or mission is in operation when
asked to do so by the head of the UN project.'98 Measures must also be
taken to protect the force or mission while carrying out its duties and to make
available existing records relating to the location of mines and booby-
traps.' 99  Similar protection is accorded to fact-finding missions of the
United Nations.00
Article 9, the final provision of the Landmines Protocol, concerns
international cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines and booby-
traps.2°' The hortatory language calls into question the utility of the
provision, but the importance of the principle of international cooperation
cannot be over-stated in the context of landmine clean-up operations. Article
9 thus calls on parties to "endeavor to reach agreement, both among
themselves and with other States and with international organizations, on the
provision of information and technical and material assistance" after the
cessation of hostilities to facilitate the removal of mines and booby-traps.2 2
The provisions in the Weapons Convention and the Landmines Protocol
uphold fundamental rules of the customary law of war in applying these
norms to particular conventional weapons. The law of war, probably more
than any other area of international law, faces the toughest challenge in
getting states conscientiously to ratify its treaties. Indeed, only thirty-seven
countries are bound by the obligations set forth in the instruments. It is
evident that in concluding an agreement pertaining to conventional weapons,
states were wary of creating for themselves the so-called "normative
boomerang.120 3 Thus, the hesitancy of states to agree to obligations which
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Landmines Protocol, art. 8, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171.
199. Id. Landmines now rank as the second major cause of casualties among U.N. peacekeepers due
to hostile action. See Mine Clearance, supra note 1.
200. Landmines Protocol, art. 8 supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171.
201. Landmines Protocol, art. 9, id.
202. Id.
203. The term "normative boomerang" was coined by Professor Brownlie in the context of
international environmental law, but seems particularly apt in the law of war context. Gunther Handl,
Transboundary Nuclear Damage, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 152 (D. McGraw ed., 1990)
(quoting Professor Ian Brownlie. 10th Sokol Colloquium, University of Virginia School of Law, April 15,
1988).
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they are unlikely or unable to adhere to in practice can be seen in the
provisions of the Landmines Protocol which do little more than put down on
paper the general principles of the law of war and link them specifically to
landmines. Such linkage has the advantage of laying the initial groundwork
from which further developments in the law of war relating to the means and
methods of warfare may be pursued, once the will to refine existing rules or
to make new ones is manifest.
E. Non-binding Instruments Relevant to the Use of Landmines
Prior to considering possible future developments in the law relating to
landmines, a consideration of the residual sources of the law in this area
should be outlined. These non-binding or "soft-law" provisions may take the
form of guidelines, resolutions, recommendations, declarations or similar
documents issued by intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental
organizations. 204  Soft-law instruments are highly valued in the field of
international environmental law and may contribute to the crystallization of
new rules of customary international law.2°5  For example, guidelines
published by the World Health Organization relating to air quality are not
formally translated into law through the treaty mechanism. However, they
have long been recognized as forming the basis for standard-setting at
national levels.206
The most famous soft-law instrument in the environmental law sphere is
the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment 0 7 which marked one of the achievements of the 1972 Stock-
holm Conference on the Environment.2 8 One provision of interest which
explicitly refers to military activities as they pertain to the environment is
Principle 26.209 This final provision of the Declaration addresses the
subject of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The efforts by
204. See generally Handl, supra note 203, at 63.
205. See, e.g., PETER H. SAND, WORLD RESOURCES INST., LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, 16, 17 (1990). See also WEISS, supra note 118, at 103. (arguing that soft-
law instruments in the sphere of international environmental law form part of the evolutionary process of
turning planetary rights and obligations into international law by contributing to the creation of customary
norms).
206. See SAND, supra note 205, at 17. There are numerous examples of soft-law principles which
may enhance or supplement rules of international environmental law and also provide springboards for
future standard-setting by drawing the attention of the international community to new areas of concern.
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers is one such example. International Law
Association, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference 484 (Helsinki, 1966). For a collection of international
soft-law instruments, see INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SoFT LAW (Marlene Jahnke, ed., 1994).
207. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 at 3 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
208. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 423 (1973).
209. Principle 26 provides: "Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons
and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant
international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons." Stockholm
Declaration, supra note 207, at 5.
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the United States at the Stockholm Conference to relate the principle to
weapons in general was not accepted."' The Stockholm Principles are of
interest to the present discussion as they highlight the concerns of internation-
al environmental law, recognize the important link between problems of
development and environmental protection, and promote and encourage
international cooperation to address environmental matters.
The World Charter for Nature, 21' adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly, restates many of the principles set forth in the Stockholm
Declaration. '1 2  Though not a binding instrument, the Charter contains
normative language which may encourage the crystallization of some of its
provisions into customary law. Moreover, the World Charter for Nature was
adopted by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.213 The
only vote against the resolution was that of the United States, which agreed
with the resolution in principle, but advocated more concrete language.2"4
There is, therefore, a strong argument in favor of regarding the Charter
principles as customary international law. Several of the principles relate to
the problem which armed conflict poses for the human environment.
Principle 5 of the General Principles division states: "Nature shall be secured
against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities. 12 5  Also
of interest with respect to the use of weapons in armed conflict is Principle
11 which provides, inter alia: "Activities which might have an impact on
nature shall be controlled, and the best available technologies that minimize
significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used. 2 16 On the
matter of implementation the World Charter asserts: "The principles set forth
in the present Charter shall be reflected in the law and practice of each State,
as well as at the international level. ,2 17 A final example of a World Charter
provision of some significance for landmine use is found in Principle 20
which reads: "Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided."2tt
Non-binding instruments are of increasing importance in the sphere of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.219 Other
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly have made a contribution
210. See Sohn, supra note 208, at 509.
211. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on October 28, 1982, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N.
GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983) [hereinafter World Charter].
212. See supra note 207.
213. The resolution was adopted by 103 votes to one, with 18 abstentions. See supra note 211.
214. Id.
215. World Charter, supra note 211, at 17.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. The fiftieth session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights passed several "soft- law"
resolutions which, like their counterparts in international environmental law, may provide useful guidelines
and standards of conduct despite their non-binding character. A Polish resolution, for example,
recommends minimum standards for part-time military or police "civil defense forces." The resolution
addresses aspects of the organization and the operation of these forces and is aimed at the prevention of
human rights violations by these groups. See CHR Res. 1994/76 (Mar. 9), U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 2, at 219, U.N. Doc. E/1994/24 (1994).
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to the development of international humanitarian law. Resolutions may
provide the impetus for convening a conference to consider a particular area
of concern or may facilitate the setting up and funding of aid programs in a
war-tom area. At the very least, they can raise public awareness. The
General Assembly Resolution on the Historical Responsibility of States for
the Preservation of Nature For Present and Future Generations, 220 for
example, emphasizes the devastating effect which the arms race has for the
preservation of nature for present and future generations. Resolution 35/71
directly addresses the problem of remnants of war, initially pushed by Libya
in relation to uncleared landmines of World War II vintage. 22 ,
The U.N. General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights have
focused increased attention on the problem of landmine clearance and other
unexploded ordnance resulting from armed conflicts throughout the world.
Resolution 1993/83 of the Commission of Human Rights considered the
effects of armed conflicts on children's lives, including the dangers posed to
children by landmines.222 The U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution
48/7 at its forty-eighth session in 1993 concerning "assistance in mine
clearance." Resolution 48/7 requested, inter alia, that the Secretary-General
prepare a report on the problems posed by the presence of landmines in
countries throughout the world and included in the provisional agenda of its
forty-ninth session an item on assistance in mine clearance.223
The above-mentioned examples are just some of the soft-law provisions
which examine military activities in light of their effects upon the environ-
ment. Scholars continue to stress the significance of soft-law tools in the
sphere of international environmental law.224  Edith Brown Weiss suggests
that the international treaty-making process places a severe burden on
220. Adopted on Oct. 30, 1980. G.A. Res. 35/8, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/8
(1980) (calling upon States to take measures necessary for preserving nature and for promoting
international cooperation in the context of the arms .race and its effect on the environment).
221. Adopted on Dec. 5, 1980. G.A. Res. 35/71, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/71
(1980). Resolution 35/71 supports the demand of States affected by material remnants of war for
compensation and appeals to all States, especially those responsible for war remnants, to cooperate with
the Secretary-General to work towards an acceptable solution. The United Kingdom and Italy, in
abstaining from the vote, explained that they could not accept any legal obligation to remove war remnants.
For the record of the debate on this issue in the Second Committee, see U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., U.N.
Doc. A/C.2/36/SR.3-6, 10-24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35 (1980); 35th Sess., A/36/PV.103 (1980). For
subsequent resolutions addressing the problem of remnants of war and reiterating the demands of
developing countries for compensation and for the removal of war remnants by those States responsible
for implanting them, see G.A. Res. 36/188, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/36/188 (1981);
G.A. Res. 37/215, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/215 (1982); G.A. Res. 38/162, U.N.
GAOR, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/162 (1983); G.A. Res. 39/167, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/39/167 (1984).
222. CHR Res. 1993/83, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 3, at 247, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23, chap. 11, sect. A
(1993).
223. G.A. Res. 48/7, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/7 (1993). The protection of the
environment has recently received attention by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
which has passed resolutions concerning environmental protection in wartime, in addition to its more
traditional focus on the protection of war victims. The resolutions, though non-legal in nature, are
nonetheless instrumental in bringing humanitarian and environmental consequences of armed conflict to
the platform of international attention.
224. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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developing countries which do not have the resources to take part in lengthy
negotiations and implementation of treaty provisions. Thus, she concludes
that in the face of pressure to slow the pace of treaty-making, States may
look to soft-law instruments with increasing regularity.225
The espousal of soft-law provisions by a State implies the existence of
a political will to move forward, if only in recognizing the need for
international law to consider the subject concerned. In the law of war
context, where it has proved so difficult to muster the political will to place
any real limitations on the means and methods of warfare, soft law provisions
purporting to regulate the choices open to the military commander are of
dubious value. However, this is not to say that there is no role for soft-law
instruments in the law of war. Indeed, such mechanisms may provide much
needed guidelines and add meaning to the general provisions housed in law
of war treaties. A persuasive argument which has not been stressed enough
in the field of international humanitarian law is that military decision-making
must factor environmental considerations into its equation. 26  Soft-law
instruments may help to drive this point home.
In sum, provisions of a non-legal, non-binding nature do have a role to
play in the law of war sphere. While they may have no contribution to make
in terms of actual military restraint, they may provide the basis for further
developments in this area of law which suffers from many unfortunate gaps.
As one author has succinctly stated: "In addition to specific treaty rules, we
also need inspirational programs, symbolic value judgments and broad policy
outlines, capable of changing attitudes, moods and societal trends." '227
While law reform and actual implementation of legal rules in the law of war
context are exceedingly difficult to achieve, there is much to be gained by
encouraging more of this type of participation. Indeed, the use of non-binding
declarations and resolutions will call attention to law of war issues.
The question remains whether the current regime relating to the use of
landmines is adequately poised to mitigate the environmental, developmental
and humanitarian problems which the widespread and indiscriminate use of
these weapons have caused.
III. A CASE FOR REFORM
Article 8 of the Weapons Convention provides for the convening of
conferences to examine additional protocols concerning other categories of
conventional weapons not covered by existing protocols, to review the scope
and application of the Convention or its protocols, and to examine any
225. EDITH BROWN WEISS, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 3, 12 (1992).
226. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 154, at 129.
227. Luzius Wildhaben, Commentary, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 79, at 89.
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proposed amendment to the Convention or its protocols.22 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 48/79,229 welcomed a request to the Secretary-General
to convene a review conference of the Convention and its annexed proto-
cols. 20 Resolution 48/79 encourages State parties to the Convention and
its annexed protocols to support the preparation of studies by governmental
experts in order to prepare for a review conference. 21  The review confer-
ence will take place in 1995.
Some of the issues which the review conference should take into account
as it considers the Landmines Protocol and the on-going landmine crisis are:
the extension of the provision in the Weapons Convention and Protocols to
non-international armed conflicts; the inclusion of mine clearance provisions
with hard content in cease-fire agreements; the development of effective
implementation measures and a system of verification of compliance with the
provisions in the Landmines Protocol; and an assessment of international
cooperation in the context of landmine clearance and landmine use. A study
of international cooperation regarding the landmine problem needs to address
coordination of mine clearance operations, the participation of non-govern-
mental organizations in assistance programs and intergovernmental meetings
which discuss weapons issues. Finally, the placement of further restrictions
on landmine use and rules regulating the manufacture and trade of landmines
require serious attention. These focal points are discussed in turn in the hope
that the opportunity and challenge for reform will be embraced at the 1995
review conference.
A. Non-international Armed Conflicts
Given the incidence of minority separatist movements throughout the
world, there is an unfortunate likelihood that internal strife and armed conflict
within state borders will continue to arise in hot-spots throughout the
world.232 A substantial portion of the work of the UN Commission on
Human Rights during its 1994 session addressed conflicts or tense situations
228. See Weapons Convention, art. 8, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 166.
229. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, G.A. Res. 48/79, U.N
GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/79 (1993).
230. The Government of France requested the Secretary-General to convene the High Contracting
Parties of the Weapons Convention and, in particular, stressed the importance of amending the Landmines
Protocol to strengthen its provisions. 47 U.N.Y.B. 138 (1993), U.N. Sales No. E.94.1.1.
23 1. See supra note 228.
232. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between human rights and internal conflict, see
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987).
See also B.G. Ramcharan, The Role of International Bodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 AM. UNIV. L. REv.
99 (1983).
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within a single country.23 3 Indeed, it is argued that the surge of internal
strife and the consequential inflation of human rights violations in the sphere
of such "non-international" armed conflicts forced the Commission to
consider norms of international humanitarian law in the course of its review
of State conduct - a domain previously left to the International Committee of
the Red Cross and the military establishment.234
The legal framework developed to address the concept of internal
conflicts in international humanitarian law is comprised of the four Geneva
Conventions and the two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions.235
Although the four Geneva Conventions adopted common Article 3 which
provides for a limited number of humanitarian principles to be applied in
non-international armed conflicts, the scope of the provisions are general and
certainly inadequate insofar as they are capable of assisting military
commanders.236 Moreover, the general principles of international humani-
tarian law set forth in common Article 3 are not adequately poised to address
the legality of the use of weapons; specific provisions relating to the use of
a class or type of weapon are apt to achieve greater results in terms of
implementation and compliance than vague and abstract rules which do not
speak to the practice of military forces in employing particular means and
methods of warfare.
The 1977 Geneva Protocol 11237 is the primary repository of law which
relates to the protection of victims of armed conflicts which are of an internal
or civil war nature. The provisions of Geneva Protocol II are intended to
develop and supplement common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.2 38  Protocol II thus inserts the most fundamental humanitarian princi-
ples into an agreement designed to extend protection to detained persons, the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians endangered by internal armed
233. For a resolution passed by the Commission concerning the conflict between the insurrectionist
forces on Bougainville, the Papua New Guinea island, see CHR 1994/81 (Mar. 9,) U.N. ESCOR, 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 230, U.N. Doc. E/1994/24 (1994). See also CHR Res. 1994/72 (Mar. 9), U.N.
ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 203 U.N. Doc. E/1994/24 (1994). (addressing numerous human rights
situations in the former Yugoslavia); CHR Res. 1994/75 (Mar. 9), U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No.
4, at 216, U.N. Doc. E/1994/24 (1994) (concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina); CHR Res. 1994/76 (Mar. 9),
U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp No. 4 at 216, U.N. Doc. E/1994/24 (1994) (concerning human rights
violations in Kosovo); CHR Res. 1994/77 (Mar. 9) U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 220, U.N.
Doc. E/1994/24 (1994) (concerning the rape and abuse of women as the result of on-going armed conflict
in the former Yugoslavia).
234. John R. Crook, The Fiftieth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 806, 814 (1994).
235. See supra notes 86, 111, 112.
236. Common Article 3 provides for minimum standards of protection to be accorded to non-
combatants, prisoners of war, and the wounded and the sick in the case of non-international armed conflict.
See supra note 111.
237. See supra note 112. See generally Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol H and its Relation
to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM.
UNIV. L. REV. 9 (1983); Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol I1: History andScope, 33 AM. UNIV. L. REV.
29 (1983).
238. See supra note I 11.
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conflict as defined in Article I .239
Part IV of Protocol II does prescribe rules designed to protect the civilian
population. Thus Part IV of Protocol II prohibits acts the primary purpose
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.240 It further
provides protection for works and installations containing dangerous
forces,"' cultural objects and places of worship, 242 and objects indispens-
able for the survival of the civilian population.243 Moreover, it prohibits the
forced movement of civilians,2 44 and allows access for relief organizations
subject to the consent of the State concerned.245 These rules do little in the
way of ensuring protection after the cessation of hostilities and do not address
the use of weapons.
The Weapons Convention and Landmines Protocol need to be amended
to extend their applicability to internal conflicts which constitute the vast
majority of armed conflicts in the world community today. This reform would
represent a significant strengthening of existing international humanitarian law
provisions which do not adequately address the means and methods of
warfare in the context of non-international armed conflicts. The extension of
the specific rules pertaining to the use of landmines to internal armed
conflicts would, therefore, fill an existing gap in international humanitarian
law.
B. Cease-Fire Agreements
The Landmines Protocol defers to agreements between parties on matters
relating to the removal of mines and booby-traps and the release of informa-
tion on the location of such weapons. 4 6 No institutions are actually created
for the kind of cooperation called for by the Landmines Protocol.
Cease-fire agreements, peace accords, and peace-keeping operation
mandates are the vehicles for addressing all matters which arise after the
cessation of hostilities. These include humanitarian concerns such as the
repatriation or resettlement of refugees and mine clearance.247 Unfortunate-
ly, the instruments which address landmine clearance tend to be vague and
239. The material field of application of Protocol II includes conflicts involving the armed forces of
a High Contracting Party within its territory and "dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Protocol 11, art. 1,
1, supra note 112, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611, 16 I.L.M. at 1443. Article I further restricts the scope of the
application of Protocol 11 by excluding from its purview "situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature." Article 1, 2, supra
note 112, at 611.
240. Id. arts. 13-18, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615-16, 16 I.L.M. at 1447.
241. Id. art. 15, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615, 16 I.L.M. at 1447.
242. Id. art. 16, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 616, 16 I.L.M. at 1447.
243. Id.
244. Id. art. 17.
245. Id. art. 18.
246. Landmines Protocol, art. 7, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170.
247. Carnahan, supra note 107, at 83.
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generally worded and therefore fail to provide the kind of substantive
framework necessary to ensure that landmine clearance-and the clearance of
other hazardous military material-takes place in an organized and coordinat-
ed fashion.24
Cease-fire arrangements need to address the matter of environmental
clean-up and set in motion the completion of a comprehensive assessment of
environmental country conditions. In particular, such agreements should
address those situations which are likely to have a direct impact on the
repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons. The
inclusion of provisions in cease-fire agreements which address these important
issues has the advantage of setting the process of reconstruction in motion.
Such inclusion allows for the realistic evaluation of repatriation measures and
relief operations. It also takes into account the need to educate returning
refugees and the need to prioritize mine clearance. Programs need to be
defined within the context of the needs and realities of differing political and
economic situations in countries faced with a land mine problem. Notwith-
standing this consideration, an annex to the Landmines Protocol or the issuing
of non-binding guidelines could contribute to the conclusion of cease-fire
agreements which anticipate the complexities of a landmine problem.
C. Implementation and Compliance Verification
The Weapons Convention does not provide for those situations when its
terms are violated. Its annexed protocols do not address this issue. There are
no provisions in the instruments regarding either individual or state responsi-
bility for breaches nor are there any provisions specifically addressing
compliance with the terms of the Weapons Convention or Protocols.
Measures to guarantee compliance with the Landmines Protocol and which
provide for responsibility for breaches and for the removal of mines would
enhance the effectiveness of the obligations pertaining to landmine use.
The creation of a verification commission, a treaty body established in
much the same way as those attached to international environmental
agreements,249 would help to ensure that possible violations of the
Landmines Protocol are addressed in an appropriate forum. Such a body
could operate within the framework of the United Nations system. Any State
party could request the initiation of an investigation in order to resolve any
248. The Geneva Agreements in the Afghanistan conflict, for example, fall short of providing any
substantive guidelines on demining operations or how safe passage for returning refugees is to be
implemented. U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess., Supp., Apr. 1988, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/19835 (1988).
249. There are several basic models which international environmental treaties employ for purposes
of international supervision of state obligations. These include regular meetings of the parties facilitated
by a permanent secretariat, a formal commission in which member states are represented; and a
commission with quasi-judicial functions whose members are independent. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note
154, at 165.
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problems relating to possible non-compliance.25 ° Any such request should
be accompanied by relevant information and available evidence regarding the
alleged breach of the Landmines Protocol. Once the commission evaluates
the information and evidence, it may decide to hold an inquiry, informing all
States of its decision to proceed. Moreover, the verification commission
should be authorized to conduct an on-site investigation by a team of
qualified experts designated by States to investigate possible violations. Any
such expert investigation should be followed by the submission of a written
report to the commission. The commission, in turn, should submit its findings
and those of the team of experts to the States parties. Where a determination
is made that a violation has occurred, the party in breach should be required
to take measures to remedy the situation. In particular, the State in question
should ensure the removal of any minefields and mines which it laid in
violation of the Landmines Protocol. In the event of a serious violation or
an emergency pertaining to compliance with the Landmines Protocol, the
verification commission should be entitled to bring the matter to the attention
of the U.N. Security Council.
A verification commission operating in accordance with the procedures
outlined above could be instrumental in securing compliance with the
obligations undertaken in the Landmines Protocol. Such a commission could
provide a forum within which States can study and evaluate the terms of the
agreement and, if necessary, defer to a body of experts to address any
problems which may arise in securing compliance. Moreover, the focus is on
facilitating implementation of the provisions as opposed to adjudicating on the
basis of a breach. It is this type of dispute settlement mechanism which may
prove especially useful in the law of weapons use arena.
D. The Facilitation of International
Cooperation in Mine Clearance
There are several ways in which international cooperation relating to the
landmine problem may be enhanced within the parameters of the existing
regime. These include facilitating closer coordination of demining operations
among the numerous assistance and relief groups involved; expanding the role
of international organizations in the context of conventional weapons issues,
and non-governmental organizations in particular; expanding the United
250. The employment of the term "verification" in the context of agreements regulating the use of
weapons is criticized by Roach who prefers to limit its application to the arms control arena where
"verification" means ensuring compliance with terms regarding testing, development, production, transfer,
stockpiling, and other provisions relating to weapons. Hence, he favors the use of the terms "complaints
procedures," "investigations," and "fact-finding procedures." Roach, supra note 136, at 62 n.172. The
distinction is probably difficult to maintain given the interests of the United States and others to introduce
arms control elements into the Landmines Protocol. See infra notes 289-292 and accompanying text. In
a written a statement submitted to the United Nations, the United States proposed, inter alia, the addition
of "a comprehensive compliance and verification regime based on the principle of cooperative
implementation." See Moratorium on the Export of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines, Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/275 (1994).
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States moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines;25" ' and requiring
technical changes in the manufacture of landmines.252 Cooperation on an
international level in these specific spheres could help address in concrete
terms the existing landmine crisis particularly in developing countries where
the problem severely strains societal structures.
1. Improved Coordination for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance
and Mine Clearance Operations
A recent General Assembly resolution253 related to mine clearance
emphasized the importance of coordinating all response measures of the
international community to the landmine crisis.2"4 Resolution 48/7 stressed
"the importance of coordination by the United Nations of
activities . . . related to mine clearance ... with a view to improving the
effectiveness of operations in the field." '255 Given the massive scale of
many international humanitarian aid projects and the scope of inefficient
duplication of efforts among the many aid organizations involved in
demining,25 6 there needs to develop a procedural framework to provide a
systematic approach to refugee problems and assistance to people temporarily
displaced.
The victims of the armed conflicts in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and
Angola continue to require relief on an unprecedented scale.25 7  It is
suggested that what may be gleaned from these and other experiences in
large-scale aid projects is the need for closer coordination of humanitarian
aid.25 Indeed, this point has been emphasized in the United Nations.259
Notwithstanding the need for coordination of assistance operations, the
responses of the international community to date have been politically, not
legally, motivated. 6°
251. See infra notes 284-288 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 289-293 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 222.
254. There are a number of activities necessary to address any landmine clearance operation. These
include mine detection and clearance, mine awareness programs to educate populations at risk such as
civilians in mined regions, and emergency and long-term rehabilitative medical care for landmine victims.
See generally ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6.
255. See supra note 222.
256. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 249.
257. See supra notes 37-64 and accompanying text.
258. Cornelio Sommaruga, Respect for International Humanitarian Law: ICRC Review of Five Years
of Activity (1987-1991), 286 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 74, 93 (1992).
259. See Briefing Note, UN Secretary-General Reports on Strengthening Coordination of Emergency
Humanitarian Assistance, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/177 (1994).
260. Thus McCalister-Smith observes:
In principle, every person and every organization seems to be in favor of coordination, but in
practice problems arise in determining who shall coordinate and who shall be coordinated. So
far, the main responses in this area are of a political, institutional, or administrative nature,
rather than of a legal character.
1995l
37
Lord: Legal Restraints in the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and Enviro
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
348 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
This observation is especially apt considering the potential problems of
coordination among organizations addressing the various environmental,
military, and medical aspects of the landmine problem. These include inter-
governmental bodies such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies
such as the World Health Organization, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, other non-governmental groups such as medical organizations, and
private industries engaged in detection and clearance of mines.261' Although
the United Nations is the biggest mine clearing agency in the world,262 not
one United Nations institution has the overall responsibility of coordinating
programs relating to mine clearance and the environmental legacy of armed
conflict.
263
There are numerous legal implications in any attempt to address the
subject of international humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately, treaty rules
do not provide practical procedural rules to govern the large-scale humanitari-
an assistance required to address humanitarian, environmental and develop-
mental concerns. Such projects entail complex technical arrangements to
facilitate the movement of demining personnel, their equipment and medical
units.264 Further arrangements must be made to safeguard the endangered
civilian population and to provide medical assistance to victims of minefields.
Such operations must include emergency assistance as well as long-term
rehabilitation, and educational projects to provide general information on the
hazards of landmines and other environmental hazards left in the wake of
armed conflict.
265
It is in this context that practice in the field of environmental protection
may provide some useful models. A recurrent theme of international
environmental law is the development of coordinated approaches to environ-
mental problems through the treaty mechanism. Increasingly, international
environmental law treaties contain specific rules of procedure concerning
common or coordinated implementation measures.266 Cooperation may take
Peter McCalister-Smith, Protection of the Civilian Population and the Prohibition of Starvation as a
Method of Warfare, 284 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 440, 454 (1991).
261. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 49-51.
262. Id. at 249.
263. The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs was recently assigned the task of coordinating
mine clearance. This is important as U.N. operations in countries with landmines problems work alongside
numerous other organizations involved in demining. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 149.
264. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 237-248.
265. See K. Eblagh, Practical Demining in Afghanistan, in SYMPOSIuM, supra note 6, at 153-166.
266. An important aspect of effective supervision and implementation of international environmental
treaty regimes is the requirement that states make periodic reports on measures taken to fulfill treaty
obligations. The Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources
requires the parties to establish a permanent monitoring system to assess "the effectiveness of measures
taken under the terms of the present Convention." Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution
from Land-Based Sources, June 4, 1974, art. I1. U.K.T.S. No. 64 (1978), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 252
(1974). International institutions tied to treaty regimes may also conduct fact-finding or research to verify
information supplied on implementation by States. See, e.g., Canberra Convention on the Conservation
of Pacific Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, art. 14, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 3487 (Article 14 provides for
the establishment of a Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources). Inspection
by international agencies is the boldest example of supervision and implementation measures in
international environmental law. Interestingly, the inspection roles of international agencies are strongest
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many different forms, depending upon the particular environmental challenge
which the treaty seeks to address.
One example lies in the depletion of the ozone layer and the recognition
by the international community that the problem requires an international
solution.267 The matter is addressed within the framework of the multilater-
al Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer which provides
for a specific structure of cooperation between the parties designed to
facilitate implementation of the treaty objectives.16' Further examples exist
of cooperative regimes institutionalized by written agreement between States
addressing the problem of pollution of international watercourses.269
Although the response to the landmine problem necessarily involves both
State and non-State actors, an appropriate framework convention and action
plan could be a suitable way to deal with technical issues and other matters
concerning landmine clearance. Indeed, the Landmines Protocol utilizes a
familiar tool of international environmental law by providing a technical
annex which specifies guidelines on recording the location of minefields,
mines, and booby-traps.
270
The landmine problem-and remnants of war in general-calls for a
coordinated international response. The landmines crisis in developing
countries demonstrates most poignantly the need for an international
multilateral conference to negotiate an international regime for the provision
of emergency humanitarian assistance. Such an international agreement
should address the issues relating to humanitarian assistance when armed
conflict occurs, as well as after hostilities have ended. Moreover, such an
agreement must take into account the environmental dimension to armed
conflict and incorporate into the framework of a humanitarian assistance
regime specific provisions related to the mitigation of adverse environmental
in arms control agreements. See, e.g., 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (1968). For an example from the field of international
environmental law involving inspection in the sphere of marine living resources, see 1978 Convention on
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the North-West Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, art. 18, U.S. Sen.
Exec. Print 1, 96: I Cong. (1978).
267. For a history of international action relating to the protection of the global atmosphere, see
Patrick Szdll, Ozone Layer and Climate Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 79, at 167.
268. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11097,
26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987). See generally Szdll, supra note 267, at 167. Here reference should be made to
the coordination of surveillance and monitoring activities to access the quality of the water of the Great
Lakes System under the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the United States and
Canada. Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978, Nov.
22, 1978, U.S.-Can., 304 U.S.T. 1385 amended by Supplementary Agreement Amending the Agreement
Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality 1978, Oct. 16, 1983,
U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 10798, amended by Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement Between the United
States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, as Amended on October 16, 1983, Nov. 18,
1987, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11551.
269. For example, international commissions have been established to deal with the pollution problems
of the Rhine, the Moselle, the Sarre, Lake Constance, Lake Geneva, the Italian-Swiss frontier waters and
the Belgian-French-Luxemburg frontier waters. Johan Lammers, International and European Community
Law Aspects of Pollution of International Watercourses, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 79, at 115, 136.
270. Landmines Protocol, Technical Annex, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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consequences and responses to environmental disasters wrought by armed
conflict. Procedural rules whereby the international community creates
conditions to facilitate the reconstruction and normalization of a war-torn
country can maintain the focus on the central aim of assistance operations:
the protection and provision of assistance to affected persons to facilitate the
reconstruction of society and promotion of sustainable development.
The recognition that the landmine crisis is essentially a problem of the
developing world with consequences extending beyond national borders271
suggests that cooperation on a large scale is required. Article 9 of the
Landmines Protocol does express the principle of international coopera-
tion.2 72 Unfortunately, its hortatory language confines it to that category of
norms which, owing to their aspirational character, are unlikely to influence
State practice in real terms. The time has come to address the provision of
humanitarian assistance in concrete terms to enable reconstruction to take
place in an orderly and comprehensive fashion and in a manner which ensures
the efficient use of available resources.
2. Non-Governmental Organizations
In the same way that international environmental law has worked to
include NGOs in international processes, so too can the role of these
organizations be strengthened in the sphere of international humanitarian law.
On October 16, 1990, the United Nations General Assembly passed
Resolution 45/6 granting the International Committee of the Red Cross
observer status in order to enhance cooperation between the United Nations
and the ICRC. 273 The step was hailed as an important one as it signalled
the need for greater cooperation between institutions both in their field
activities and in their efforts to encourage respect for the laws of war.274
Phillippe Sands has called for the role of NGOs to be enhanced in
international law and suggests that such a move can contribute to shifts in the
understanding of the principle of state sovereignty and the recognition of
environmental rights. 75 The role of NGOs within the sphere of environ-
mental protection has been characterized as follows:
They have become increasingly effective through achieving consultative
status at international and regional organizations where their representation
and the personal lobbying of their representatives may, if to the point and
well researched, influence the negotiating process when conventions and
resolutions are in the process of drafting or adoption.
271. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 10.
272. Landmines Protocol, art. 8, supra note 140, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171.
273. G.A. Res. 45/6, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/45/L.7 and Add.I (1990).
274. Miscellaneous Comments, 279 INT'L REv. RED CROSs 585 (1990).
275. Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. L.R. 392
(1989).
276. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 154, at 76.
[Vol. 25
40
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1995], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss2/3
LEGAL RESTRAINTS IN THE USE OF LANDMINES
In addition to providing for the exchange of information and ideas
between treaty negotiators and NGOs, such representation at international
meetings may facilitate the coordination of the activities and policies of
NGOs. 27  A secondary benefit of enhancing the status of NGOs at the
international level is the opportunity to promote greater understanding
between all interested parties. In the sphere of international humanitarian law
this is particularly important given the polarity of views which may arise
between military representatives and NGOs and which may often be fueled
by misconceptions on both sides of the debate.
International environmental law again provides an example. The treaty
mechanism which frequently gives NGOs consultative status in international
environmental law agreements is incorporated in Article XI of the Convention
on Trade in Endangered Species.2 7' Article XI allows agencies of the
United Nations to attend meetings of the Conference and also allows NGOs
to be present at meetings, subject to certain conditions.279 Similarly, a
provision for the representation of interested organizations in the sphere of
international humanitarian law could be incorporated into existing treaties,
such as the Weapons Convention, to enhance cooperation and coordination
of activities which is crucial in the massive operations required for demining.
Non-governmental groups are beginning to make a substantial impact in
many international law contexts by channeling proposals to States through
their consultative status in international organizations, treaty-making bodies,
and international conferences and through participation rights in meetings
such as preparatory conferences for international conventions.'" These
forms of participation provide an opportunity to encourage policy changes
which can, in time, lead to substantive legal reform.
3. The Placement of Further Restrictions on Mine Use
The implementation of the mapping, recording and reporting procedures
in the Landmines Protocol assumes that users of mines and similar devices
277. The European Environment Bureau is a body through which over sixty NGOs dealing with the
European Union receive information and coordinate their activities relating to environmental issues. The
EEB also holds workshops, convenes conferences and otherwise facilitates communication between NGOs
and government officials. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 154, at 77.
278. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 251 [hereinafter Wild Fauna]. There are a number of
other international environmental treaties which allow observer status for environmental NGOs. See, e.g.,
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, art 6(5), T.I.A.S. No. 11097,
at 4, 26 I.L.M. 1529, 1532 (1985); Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
June 23, 1979, art. 7(9), Cmnd. 7888, 19 I.L.M. 15, 23 (1980); Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 15(6), U.N. Doc.
UNEP/WG.190/4, UNEP/IG.80/3 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
279. Wild Fauna, supra note 278, 27 U.S.T. at 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251.
280. See generally FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
68-90 (1986).
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will have a strong incentive to protect themselves. 21' This assumes too
much, as illustrated by the widespread use of mines, especially in internal
conflicts. Landmines and cheap anti-personnel mines are increasingly
employed in the local and regional conflicts of the post-Cold War era.28 2
In order for the implementation of the mapping, recording and reporting
procedures to take place in any comprehensive fashion, at the very least, the
dissemination of information pertaining to the inherent dangers of mine use
must be expanded. Here the mandate of the new U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights is significant. Resolution 48/141 entrusts the High
Commissioner to, inter alia, "coordinate relevant United Nations education
and public information programs in the field of human rights. '283  The
challenge for the High Commissioner will be to ensure that those who are in
greatest need of information and education will be reached by human rights
agencies throughout the world. The current landmine crisis poignantly
illustrates the necessity of disseminating humanitarian rules to those engaged
in armed conflict and informing and educating citizens about the dangers of
mines.
While the dissemination of educational material on the dangers of
remnants of war, including landmines, and rules of international humanitarian
law are important, the better solution to the landmine problem lies in the
extension of the current U.S. ban on the export of anti-personnel mines to all
producing countries.284 The United States has taken the lead in advocating
an international ban on the sale, export and transfer abroad of landmines.2"5
Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, the Landmine Moratorium Act prohibits
the sale or financing of a sale or transfer of landmines and, in addition, bans
the licensing of landmines for export.28 6 An amendment to the legislation
was introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy which requires the President to
provide a report to Congress regarding international mine clearing initiatives
in situations which have a bearing on the repatriation and resettlement of
refugees.287  The State Department report was released in July 1993
pursuant to legislation enacted under Senator Kennedy's initiative.288  The
Landmine Moratorium has been extended and the hope is that more states
281. The observation that "new forms of conflict, particularly ethnic conflict, give rise to new abuses"
and that ethnic warfare "tends to alter the usual insurgency-counterinsurgency calculations that might
otherwise constrain the use of landmines in internal wars" lead one report to conclude that "one side in
an ethnic conflict . . may not care about permanently ruining the land of its ethnic enemy if it does not
plan to occupy that land." ARms PROJECT, supra note 6, at 9.
282. The current outbreak in internal conflicts, such as those in Iraqi-Kurdistan, the former
Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union has exacerbated the current landmines crisis. ARMs PROJECT,
supra note 6, at 10.
283. G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (1994).
284. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 57 Fed. Reg. 228 (1992) [hereinafter
Authorization Act].
285. The U.S. legislation is the first such legislation in the world. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 6, at
320.
286. Authorization Act, supra note 285.
287. Id.
288. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6.
[Vol. 25
42
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1995], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss2/3
LEGAL RESTRAINTS IN THE USE OF LANDMINES
involved in the production of anti-personnel mines will take similar action in
the near future. 9
4. Rules Regulating the Manufacture of Landmines
The inability of modem demining technology to detect plastic and
minimum metal mines raises the cost of clearance and increases the danger
to civilians and military personnel.29° Of further concern is the emphasis
on development and research in the area of demining placed upon minefield
breaching as opposed to minefield clearance.2 9 1 No current form of clear-
ance devices give the high clearance ratios necessary for humanitarian mine
clearance. 92 These issues must be addressed so that military countermining
activities place as great an emphasis upon demining and the removal of all
mines from an area to safeguard civilians as has been placed upon breaching
minefields which clears a safe path through a minefield for the use of troops
and military equipment. 93
In an address by the United States representative to the International
Conference for the Protection of War Victims, held in Geneva in August,
1993, the following assertion was made: "[T]he international community
should take steps to limit the trade in those landmines that pose the greatest
threat to civilians-those that lack self-neutralizing features and have
insufficient quantities of metal to be detected easily."'2 94
The Weapons Conference convening in 1995 should focus on convincing
countries to require manufacturers to equip mines with self-neutralizing or
self-destruct mechanisms or, at the very least, to insert enough metallic
material in the mines to allow for easier detection. A further improvement
to the Weapons Convention and Landmines Protocol would be, therefore,
amendments pertaining to the technical requirements of landmines. An
amendment should prohibit the use of remotely-delivered mines unless they
are used against a military objective and they posses a neutralizing mecha-
nism or a self-destruct mechanism. The requirement of such devices can
289. Indeed, the moratorium has been extended and now includes Italy, one of the largest
manufacturers of landmines. See Moratorium on the Export of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines, Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/275/Add. l (1994). Measures to ban or restrict
the export of anti-personnel landmines also have been adopted by France, Belgium, Argentina, Canada,
Israel, Germany, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Id. See also U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A.49/PV.I I (1994) (statement before the General Assembly by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Italy formally announcing the national moratorium on the export of anti-personnel
mines). For the recent declaration by the Czech Republic declaring a three-year moratorium on the export
of anti-personnel mines, see Letter dated 2 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the
Czech Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/49/6 (1994).
290. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
291. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 16-17.
292. Patrick M. Blagden, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 117, 120.
293. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 15, 16.
294. Warren Zimmerman, Protection of War Victims, Address Before the International Conference
for the Protection of War Victims (August 30, 1993), in DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Sept. 6, 1993 at 615.
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ensure that remotely-delivered mines may be destroyed or rendered harmless
after the weapon has ceased to serve a military purpose.
It remains to be seen whether the international community is determined
to place further restrictions on the use of landmines or, more radically, limit
their trade and manner of manufacture. The importance of making environ-
mental consequences a serious consideration in military decision-making
needs to be emphasized so that the gathering momentum may propel the
international community to adopt these urgently required measures.
CONCLUSION
Changes in the nature of modem warfare have rendered meaningless in
practical terms the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In
recent decades, weapons technology has made exponential advances which,
in some instances, improve accuracy so that targets are reached with
minimum collateral damage. On the other hand, rapid technological advances
have also spilled over from the field of combat into the civilian domain
resulting in massive civilian casualties and extensive environmental dam-
age.295 This is nowhere more evident than in the sphere of landmine use.
Countries are no longer divided over the issue of the compatibility of
environmental protection and economic development, a major point of
contention at Stockholm.296 Today there is acceptance of the view that
economic development must embrace the concept of environmental protec-
tion. The current debate has been characterized by Edith Brown Weiss as an
equity issue; that is, countries must find a way to finance economic
development in a manner which is environmentally sustainable for both
present and future generations.297 Special consideration must be given in
respect of developing countries which are confronted with the dual objectives
of environmental protection and economic development. Indeed, international
environmental law contains obligations requiring developed countries to assist
developing ones in implementing treaty norms. This approach accepts the
view that developing countries must first achieve economic strength through
industrial and agricultural progress before they can be expected to undertake
full participation in the international protection of the environment. This is
an entirely academic debate for countries tom apart by war and faced with the
challenges of promoting economic development and social welfare in the face
of mined infrastructure, and agricultural and grazing lands. Moreover, the
inability of landmine victims to work and their need for expensive medical
care adds a further dimension to the challenge of reconstruction.
The restraints imposed on the international legal system by the principle
of military necessity will not enable international law to approach the issue
295. See generally OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, supra note 6.
296. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
297. WEISS, supra note 225, at 4.
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of landmines in anything like the comprehensive fashion of other international
agreements which address forms of pollution without a law of war connec-
tion. Moreover, the landmine crisis stands in contrast to those environmental
problems which have immediate and direct transboundary implications:
pollution in the form of war remnants and anti-personnel mines in particular
do not present the same kind of immediate global threat as does depletion of
the ozone layer, destruction of the rain forests, or nuclear plant disasters.
Given the scope of the existing landmine problem and the potential for
harmful consequences extending into the future, environmental lawyers should
pause and focus their attention on this issue. Clearly this is a problem which
cannot be divorced from its obvious context within international humanitarian
law, but the lessons of international environmental law may well prove useful
in addressing aspects of the landmine problem.
Until the military usefulness of landmine warfare subsides and there
develops the will to enact a general prohibition against the use of all
landmines, preventive measures in the way of mapping minefields and
dissemination of mine-awareness information and law of war provisions must
suffice. Where a landmine or unexploded ordnance crisis develops, thorough
clearing operations after the cessation of hostilities must be undertaken in a
spirit of cooperation which addresses every aspect of the task. While there
may well lie dormant in existing norms a total prohibition against the use of
landmines, members of the international community of States and the United
Nations must harness their forces now to deal with the effects of landmines
and to ensure that economic development is not thwarted by the humanitarian
and environmental destruction which landmines have sown.
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